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21. Introduction
Fifteen years of abundant research in the legal origins literature has established that legal
traditions are strongly related to creditor and investor rights, efficiency and quality of legal
systems, and economic regulation. The pioneering papers of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) analyze
the effect of legal traditions on the legal protection of corporate shareholders and creditors,
finding that common law countries have stronger investor and creditor rights than civil law
countries. Subsequent work has confirmed these initial results for a larger sample of countries,
improved indicators of legal rules and over a wider time interval (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer –hereafter LLS– 2006; Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 2007; Djankov et al. 2008b).
Related research has shown that common law countries are associated with lower legal
formalism, more efficiency of contract and debt enforcement, higher judicial independence and,
in general, higher quality of legal systems (Djankov et al. 2003b; La Porta et al. 2004; Djankov
et al. 2008a; Balas et al. 2009). All this literature advocates that the British common law is
associated with better rules and outcomes than the French civil law in many areas of the legal
system.1
As a result of the unprecedented popularity gained by the Legal Origins Theory, a number of
criticisms have been raised (among others, Rajan and Zingales 2003; Licht, Goldschmidt and
Schwartz 2005; Roe 2006; Roe and Siegel 2009; and Spamann 2010a, b). Within the context of
the present paper, it is particularly relevant the point made by Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard
(2003a, b) who argue that the manner in which legal systems are obtained is more important than
the specific countries’ legal traditions to explain the quality of legal systems. They differentiate
among origin countries, receptive transplants and unreceptive transplants, with the first two
categories being related to higher legal effectiveness. Whether legal transplants are receptive or
not depends on the adaptation of the imported law to local conditions and on the population’s
familiarity with law principles.
In parallel to the Legal Origins Theory, a growing body of research pioneered by the work of
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson –hereafter AJR–
(2001, 2002) has developed. This strand of the literature, known as the endowments view,
emphasizes that initial conditions existing in territories colonized by European powers were
1 It has also been shown that governments in common law countries intervene and regulate to a lesser extent the
economy (LLS 2002; Djankov et al. 2002; Botero et al. 2004). In addition, the common law appears superior to the
French civil law in terms of financial development (La Porta et al. 1998; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003a).
This is explained by the lower judicial formalism and the greater ability for the common law to evolve as a response
to changing circumstances (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003b). See Beck and Levine (2005) and LLS (2008)
for authoritative reviews of the legal origins literature.
3crucial in explaining institutional development in former colonies. Endowments such as the
disease environment, indigenous population density or resources abundance determined the
colonial strategy and created the incentives to establish different types of institutions. However,
according to this view, legal traditions are not considered as decisive determinants of
institutional development.
Some authors have combined the endowments view and the legal origins literature. Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) and Levine (2005) provide empirical evidence showing that
both legal traditions and initial endowments are important factors to explain financial
development and property rights protection. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), in trying to
distinguish between property rights and contracting institutions, find that endowments influence
to a greater extent the former while legal origin has more impact on the latter. By borrowing
ideas from the law and finance literature, the endowments view and the “transplant effect”
hypothesis, Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2014) showed that the effect of the common law on
financial development is conditioned by the level of initial endowments. Extensive evidence
indicates that the common law has led to higher private credit and stock market capitalization
only in sparsely populated territories at the arrival of Europeans, where this legal tradition could
be effectively introduced by European practitioners. On the contrary, the effect of the French
civil law on financial development is invariant to endowments. In that paper we anticipated that
the likely mechanism responsible for the heterogeneity observed across legal traditions lies in the
distinct response of European powers’ colonial strategies to endowments, but we did not assess
its empirical validity.
This article goes one step further and assesses thoroughly the mechanisms linking precolonial
conditions and their interaction with legal traditions to postcolonial legal outcomes. In addition,
this paper differs from Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2014) in that, instead of analyzing the
determinants of financial development, it brings additional insights into the core of the Legal
Origins Theory that focuses on the relationship between legal traditions and legal rules and
regulations by arguing that the process of distribution of legal traditions from origin countries to
colonies is crucial to understand that relationship. Legal families were transferred from only few
mother European countries to the rest of the world. An assumption made by the Legal Origins
Theory is that the essential characteristics of each legal tradition remain both in origin and
transplanted countries, and also implicitly that the implantation was homogeneous across
4countries within the same legal tradition.2 By doing so, the literature so far groups countries
together according to their legal traditions and analyzes how these legal families are related to
different aspects of a country’s legal system.
This paper contributes to the Legal Origins Theory by showing that the relative legal rules and
outcomes (in terms of creditor and investor rights, credit information, legal system efficiency
and regulatory burden) of the British common law vs. the French civil law are associated with
the colonial strategies followed by mother countries when implanting their legal systems in their
colonial dominions. We argue that the distribution of legal traditions was highly heterogeneous,
with initial endowments in colonized territories being the key factor explaining this diversity.3
To illustrate this point, Figures 1 to 2 show how different the relationship of both investor
protection and time to enforce contracts with precolonial population density is across common
law and civil law colonies. In our view, this fact reflects the differentiated impact that the
presence of native population had on the distribution of each legal tradition.
[Insert Figures 1 to 2 about here]
On the one hand, the transplantation of the common law was inversely related to the level of
population density at the time of colonization. This was due to the nature of British colonial
policy, which did not want to interfere with preexisting native law and rules of indigenous
societies (Zweigert and Kötz 1998; Glendon, Carozza, and Picker 2008). Thus, in sparsely
populated territories with a temperate climate the common law was extensively transferred and,
consequently, we observe the usual features associated with this legal tradition, that is, high
creditor and investor rights, effective legal systems and low regulation of the economy. In
2 Although Djankov et al. (2003a) note that the way law and institutions are transplanted matters and LLS (2008)
recognize that not all countries received legal traditions through conquest or colonization (for example, Latin
America), beyond this clarification these authors do not account for the peculiarities of the implantation process.
3 Following the endowments view literature, we refer to endowments as those initial conditions in colonized
territories that were crucial in accounting for the colonial strategies followed by European powers. Even though the
body of the paper uses precolonial population density (indicating the extent of indigenous labor abundance and
precolonial prosperity) as the main endowment variable, one needs to conceive endowments in a broad sense, also
considering other aspects such as the disease environment caused by the type of climate (tropical vs. temperate).
Toward this end, we complement the analysis with the use of the potential mortality rate of European settlers, with
the results being remarkably robust to the endowment indicator employed. Since the word endowments may evoke
positive factors, for the sake of clarity, we henceforth employ the term “adverse endowments” instead of “high
levels of endowments” to refer to either high precolonial population density or high potential settler mortality (as
they are both generally associated with low European settlement and the predominance of extractive colonial
strategies conducive to political and legal structures aimed to exploit indigenous resources, rather than build sound
property rights (AJR 2001, 2002; Levine 2005). Likewise, we use the term “favorable endowments” instead of “low
levels of endowments” to refer to either low precolonial population density or low potential settler mortality (as they
are both conductive to more European settlement, which favored the transmission of legal systems and led to
inclusive institutions).
5contrast, in those places with a large indigenous population and unfavorable disease conditions,
few if any of these features are observed, since the legal and institutional transfer was very
superficial and could even have negative consequences. This is because the widespread use of
indirect rule in these colonies led to the empowerment of local elites who, unlike precolonial
times, were no longer subject to traditional checks by the native population and could mold
customary law, which was not formalized, in their own benefit (Daniels, Trebilcock, and Carson
2011; Lange 2004). In short, low precolonial population density and the likelihood of the British
colonial power moving in are highly correlated so that in colonies where the conditions were ripe
for the colonizers to live there, they adopted the common law. However, in those places where
lots of people already lived or where it was hard for settlers to survive, the introduction of the
common law either did not occur or, if it did, was too hard to enforce among the indigenous
population.
On the other hand, France imposed its civil law rigidly across its empire, leading frequently to
conflicts with existing laws. Since this colonial policy was largely independent of the particular
circumstances of the colonized territories, the distribution of the French civil law across colonial
dominions was more uniform than in the British case. In addition, as a related question to the
distribution of the French civil law, we support the view that former Spanish colonies deserve
separate treatment since they share a common Castilian law legacy and a different adoption of
the Civil Code by imitation. Both characteristics warn against mixing these countries with those
colonies where the French civil law was implanted by France itself. Former Spanish colonies
experienced a better assimilation of the civil law and, therefore, one expects better legal
outcomes for this group compared to French colonies.
Our empirical analysis provides extensive evidence supporting the thesis proposed in this paper
about the presence of heterogeneity in the distribution of legal traditions for a cross-section of
100 former colonies. An interaction model is used to explain a variety of legal rules/outcomes
through legal traditions, indigenous population density and their interaction. We employ as
dependent variables legal indicators such as creditor and investor rights, credit information
sharing institutions, enforcement of debts and contracts and regulatory burden from Doing
Business in addition to firm and household survey-based legal outcomes. This not only enables
us to cover the main dimensions of the law-making process and regulation previously studied by
the legal origins literature, but also to extend the analysis through the use of a wide array of
indicators measuring how firms and households perceive and experience the legal and regulatory
systems. Our findings can be summarized as follows: 1) according to our thesis, for common law
countries we find a consistent and robust negative relationship between endowments and legal
6outcomes; 2) in contrast, for the French civil law tradition we do not observe any clear-cut
pattern between endowments and legal outcomes; 3) for many legal indicators the British
common law does not lead to better legal outcomes than the French civil law at high levels of
precolonial population density or potential settler mortality; 4) former colonies deriving their
legal systems from Spain exhibit in general higher scores in legal variables than those obtaining
the civil law from France itself; 5) the form of colonial rule in British colonies mediates between
endowments and postcolonial legal outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how the British
common law and the French civil law were distributed around the world, thereby emphasizing
the role played by endowments in that process. Section 3 describes the empirical approach and
data used. Section 4 presents the basic regression evidence. Section 5 reports the results of the
sensitivity analysis and those obtained with firm and household survey-based data on legal and
regulatory outcomes. Section 6 explores the mechanism linking initial endowments and their
interaction with legal traditions to current legal outcomes. Section 7 puts forward some
implications and concludes.
2. How Colonial Powers Distributed their Legal Traditions
This section consists of four parts. Firstly, we make some general remarks about the
importance of the distribution of legal traditions in the Legal Origins Theory. Secondly, we
introduce the role played by endowments in the colonial strategies of mother countries when
implanting their legal systems in the colonies. Finally, we describe how the British common law
and the French civil law were distributed around the world.
2.1. On the Importance of the Distribution of Legal Traditions
It is not our intention here to repeat general issues concerning the Legal Origins Theory, which
are well described in other papers (see Beck and Levine 2005; LLS 2008). Rather, our aim is to
focus on the key aspect of the distribution of legal traditions which, despite its relevance, has not
received much attention. We make four general comments about the importance of this process
for the Legal Origins Theory. First, the vast majority of countries are “non-origin” countries,
which means that the process of distribution of legal traditions is pivotal by itself and,
consequently, almost all the evidence provided in the literature relies on differences among
“non-origin” countries.4 Second, it is argued that “legal traditions were typically introduced into
4 In fact, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, p. 1221) state that “the empirical results described [regarding the Legal Origins
Theory] are driven almost entirely by former colonies rather than by England and France”. Thus, a basic ingredient
of the Legal Origins Theory is –in words of LLS (2008, pp. 306-7)– that legal traditions “were transplanted by the
origin countries to most of the world”.
7various countries through conquest and colonization and, as such, were largely exogenous” (LLS
2008, p. 286). This highlights that only “non-origin” countries possibly allow us to make causal
statements. Thus, much of what is written about the effect of legal origins is possible because
this variable appears exogenous for most countries. Third, related to the preceding, colonialism
is a phenomenon of great importance for the distribution of legal traditions, since it made it
possible to spread European legal systems around the world. Thus, questions such as the initial
conditions existing in colonized territories or the colonial strategies implemented by European
powers are key factors to bear in mind when explaining such a distribution.
Fourth, it is generally assumed that countries belonging to each legal tradition received
“specific laws and codes and the more general styles or ideologies of the legal system” in the
transplantation process and, despite further legal evolution at the national level, “the basic
transplanted elements have remained and persisted” (LLS 2008, p. 288). Most importantly, it has
been implicitly assumed that the implantation process was homogeneous within legal traditions.5
This explains why countries are simply grouped into four legal traditions (the British common
law and the German, Scandinavian and French civil law) and why many legal features and
outcomes are associated with these legal families abstractly, that is, without differentiating
countries within them. In this section we describe how the distribution of the British common
law and the French civil law was very different and the main implications resulting from that.
2.2. The Role Played by Endowments
To account for the process of transplantation from mother countries to “non-origin” countries
is crucial to bring into the discussion the role played by endowments. According to Engerman
and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) and AJR (2001, 2002), factors such as indigenous population density,
resources abundance or tropical disease determined the colonial strategy of European powers and
shaped the incentives to create different types of institutions. Adverse endowments in the form
of high indigenous population density or high settler mortality rates are generally associated with
low European settlement and the prevalence of extractive institutions. Following this literature,
we argue that initial endowments also conditioned the strategy of implantation of metropolitans’
legal systems in the colonies. Ross Levine (2005), in fact, raises the possibility that legal
traditions and endowments interact. He suspects that the negative effect of the French civil law
5 Daniels, Trebilcock, and Carson (2011) agree on this point by arguing that one of the assumptions underlying the
claim about the superior performance of the British common law is that transplanted institutions were imposed
uniformly across territories; an assumption they clearly question. In addition, it is assumed that the transplantation
of law entailed not just legal rules but also other organizational features of legal systems (Pistor 2009), which gives
more room for the possibility of heterogeneity in the distribution process.
8could be particularly large in territories with adverse endowments. However, as we show below,
it is not the effect of the French civil law that worsens with adverse endowments but that of the
common law.
The core of our analysis is conducted with a particular measure of endowments, namely,
precolonial population density. We motivate the choice of this variable as our preferred
endowments indicator on the grounds that it was a key factor that conditioned colonial legal
policies in several ways. First, the presence of high indigenous population density limited
European settlements (Easterly and Levine 2012), which is an important factor for the type of
legal-administrative institutions established in the colonies as well as for the transmission of
legal expertise. Second, where Europeans found more prosperous and densely populated
societies they had incentives to build coercive legal systems to exploit indigenous resources.6
Third, high precolonial population density can be associated with the preexistence of a society
(or political entity more or less organized) with its own rules, following the Roman maxim “Ubi
Societas, Ibi Ius”. Importantly, the response of colonial powers to native rules is a decisive
factor to explain the differences in the distribution of legal traditions across colonial empires. As
pointed out below, Britain responded differently from France, trying to preserve indigenous rules
to a greater extent (Zweigert and Kötz 1998; Glendon, Carozza, and Picker 2008).
Before turning to describe the pattern of distribution of the common law, we justify our focus
on a sample of former colonies as the most appropriate way to analyze the issues at hand. It is
due to two main reasons. First, the basis of our argument is the presence of heterogeneity in the
way legal systems were transmitted from origin to “non-origin” countries. Within the second
category, former colonies are the vast majority and represent the only group for which legal
traditions are arguably exogenous. In Europe, for example, although Napoleon imposed its Code
on the territories conquered by the French army, there have always been mutual legal influences
throughout history. Thus, the rediscovery of Roman law (Justinian’s Digest) in the northern Italy
monasteries, along with the canon law from the Catholic Church, laid the foundation for the ius
commune that prevailed in continental Europe since the Middle Ages. In contrast, the
implantation of European legal traditions in the colonies constituted a radical change relative to
6 In the territories of the Aztec and Inca empires, Spain employed a system of coercive labor (the “encomienda”) to
exploit the abundant human resources. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, Ch. 1), the key factor behind
the different colonial strategies followed by Spain and England in the New World was the presence or not of native
population that could be used as forced labor. The importance of precolonial population density in accounting for
the colonial strategies and policies is reflected in its widespread use in the literature (see, among others, Fieldhouse
1966; Engerman and Sokoloff 2000; Mahoney 2003; Lange 2004; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Bruhn and
Gallego 2012).
9their situation before being colonized. Consequently, by focusing on former colonies the
exogeneity of legal origins is stronger.7 Second, we base our analysis on the role played by
endowments in the distribution of legal traditions through conditioning the colonial strategies of
European powers, which only holds for the group of former colonies.
2.3. The Distribution of the British Common Law
Comparative law scholars have documented well that the common law was exported in a
heterogeneous way across the British colonial empire. Zweigert and Kötz (1998) differentiate
two groups of colonies: the settler colonies, which at the time of colonization were “unoccupied
or occupied only by natives at a very early stage of civilization and not yet politically organized”
(p. 220); and the rest, which were colonies previously controlled by native kings or other
European powers. In the first group Britain transplanted the common law mechanically, while in
the second the legal policy did not aim to replace the existing native rules but to preserve them.
Accordingly, in North American and Australasian colonies there was a deep transfer of the
common law directly by European practitioners, whereas in African colonies “to much the
largest part of the African population the Common Law is of almost no practical significance”
(p. 230). On the same issue, Glendon, Carozza, and Picker (2008) point out that the former
group of colonies was characterized by the absence of “civilized” local law and the presence of
only a small indigenous population, whereas the latter comprised more densely populated
territories which in many instances had well-established customary rules.8
Behind this heterogeneity in the distribution of the common law is the fact that Britain opted
for a “flexible” colonial administration system, which was variable to local conditions, featured a
high degree of local autonomy and in many parts of the empire took the form of indirect rule
(Fieldhouse 1966). “[It] was pragmatic in terms of the adaptation of British law” (Schmidhauser
7 Michaels (2009) remarks that the “ingenious idea” of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) to solve the endogeneity
problem between legal rules and economic performance was “to look at settings in which law was not co-original
with society but instead was imposed as an external factor”, which they found “in the context of colonization, where
law was […] imposed externally by the colonizing power, with a random distribution of different legal systems
depending on which European country colonized parts of the non-European world.” (p. 769).
8 Daniels, Trebilcock, and Carson (2011) emphasize the high degree of variability in jurisdictional arrangements and
institutions in the British Empire, which were responsive to the initial conditions encountered by colonizers,
including the preexisting indigenous legal order. Outside of the settler colonies, territories under British control did
not experience a complete transplantation of the common law and a subsequent displacement of native rules. In
practice, the implantation process of the British law in each colony led to a unique corpus of law that differed from
that in other colonies. Roe and Siegel (2009) also stress that Britain did not seek to uniformly transplant its own
legal institutions to its colonies, since their widespread transfer would have been incompatible with ruling an
empire. Thus, when Britain faced the occupation and control of Africa, it was clear the dangers that an
“indiscriminate transfer of British legal practices” posed to colonial domination (Young 1988).
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1992, p. 323). Regarding this style of colonial government, Zweigert and Kötz (1998) point out
that “English policy was different [than the French]: true to the principle of ‘Indirect Rule’,
English colonial administrators relied as much as possible on existing native rules, kept the local
courts decentralized, and left mature native law almost intact” (p. 113).9 Lange (2004) argues
that indirect rule strengthened the positions of traditional chiefs as customary law administrators,
who molded and interpreted customary law in their own benefit, thereby leading to abuses of
power. This further promoted the control of economic resources by local elites, imperfect
protection of property rights, social instability and conflict over the exercise of power (Berry
1992; Mamdani 1996).10
The colonial experience of Nigeria gives a good account of the negative effects –intended or
not– derived from the system of indirect rule. The British established a parallel jurisdictional
model consisting of colonial courts that dealt only with matters involving Europeans and native
courts that, under indigenous customs and rules, handled all disputes between non-Europeans.
This dual court system for dispute resolution implied a minimal contact of most indigenous
population with the common law and a high degree of inconsistencies and uncertainties in the
legal system.11 Another important feature of indirect rule was that native chiefs were granted
legislative, executive and judicial powers in order to control social relations in their chiefdoms,
thereby being accountable only to British officials (Lange 2004). Since these chiefs were no
longer subject to traditional checks by the native population as in precolonial times, they
undermined the historical legitimacy of the native court system as well as the effectiveness of
their customary law. It was even worse in Southern Nigeria and Kenya where, in the absence of
9 Even though indirect rule was previously applied in some parts of India, Lord Lugard is known to be the colonial
administrator that theorized it. In Lugard (1919, p. 298), he argues for “a single Government in which the native
chiefs have well-defined duties and an acknowledged status equalling with the British officials” (see also Lugard,
1922). Thus, indirect rule was based on cooperation, rather than subordination as in the French case (Crowder 1964;
Betts 1985). According to Lange (2004, p. 906), the most commonly view for indirect rule is that of Fisher (1991)
who describes it as “the incorporation of indigenous institutions –not simply individuals– into an overall structure of
colonial domination. From this view, direct rule differs from indirect rule in that it involves the construction of a
complete system of colonial domination that lacks any relatively autonomous indigenous component, yet which
might be staffed overwhelmingly by indigenous actors.”
10 Lange (2004) points out that the degree of indirect rule –that he measures as colonial dependence on customary
courts– was related to local conditions such as the disease environment and precolonial population density. In
Section 6 we implement an exercise in which endowments act as instruments for the extent of direct/indirect rule to
explain current legal rules and outcomes.
11 This situation has persisted over the postcolonial era. As a matter of fact, in other indirectly ruled colonies such as
Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia, the English law that today forms the basis of the legal system remains
alienating to most people. “Such law is not embedded in the customs and traditions of those societies; it is complex,
technical and expensive to implement. For ordinary people it is inaccessible, often physically remote and in many
cases conducted in a language they do not understand.” (Robins 2009, p. 2).
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traditional indigenous rulers, the British opted for appointing local headmen as new leaders
vested with authority over the native population (Daniels, Trebilcock, and Carson 2011).12 Also
related is the issue of “custom invention” by local chiefs that often gave rise to misleading
“descriptions of the main features of the political system, customary law and land tenure”
(Chilver 1963, p. 110). This enabled them to coerce the local population by controlling chiefdom
police forces, customary courts and people’s access to land (Lange 2009; Daniels, Trebilcock,
and Carson 2011). According to Migdal (1988), Ben-Jua (1995), Mamdani (1996), Herbst (2000)
and Lange (2009), indirect rule set the stage for subsequent postcolonial collapse by
institutionalizing despotism and contributing to the creation of neo-patrimonial states (where the
traditional authority of chiefs to rule peripheral areas is captured by the central elites), thereby
leading to an ineffective central administration unable to enforce law and order.
The high variability in the way the common law was exported to colonial societies had
important consequences. In sparsely populated territories with a favorable disease environment
the common law was extensively implanted and fitted well with the colonial society. This led to
a more intense legal-institutional transfer, which made it possible to develop a legal system that
is comparable in many respects to the British one. In these cases, the positive features associated
with the common law are expected to prevail, and therefore, the legal system can provide good
protection of investor and creditor rights as well as be efficient at enforcing private contracts and
debts. By contrast, in places with a relatively large indigenous population and adverse disease
conditions to European settlement, indirect rule generally prevailed, which led to the superficial
application of the British law that barely influenced and even distorted previous legal practices
based on customary law. Hence, the legal systems arising in such territories are not comparable
to that of the origin country, which implies that they are unlikely to feature either a high degree
of creditor and investor rights or efficient legal enforcement.
2.4. The Distribution of the French Civil Law
The distribution of the French civil law differs in several respects from that of the common
law. An important aspect is that while it is clear that the common law was distributed by Britain
12 A contemporary at that time and firm supporter of indirect rule like Perham (1934a) explicitly admitted the
difficulties colonial officers were facing in recognizing the true native authorities, which resulted in the appointment
of many “wrong headmen” that really owed authority to their willingness to collaborate with colonial officials and
had no claim to legitimacy on the basis of their lineage. Discussing the nature of indirect rule, Perham (1934b) also
admitted that “[t]here is some truth in the complaint that it fails to preserve African societies and distorts their
development in the attempt to adapt them. [...] Numerous examples can be quoted of attempts to turn African
chieftainship with its peculiar attributes and its numerous limitations into an autocracy or, more often, a bureaucratic
agency of the foreign power” (p. 327). On the consequences of the creation of “warrant” chiefs as a new political
authority, see Crowder and Ikime (1970), Afigbo (1972, 1985), Wylie (1977) and Migdal (1988).
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across its empire via colonialism, the French civil law was exported in a number of ways. On the
one hand, there is a group of former colonies that received the civil law by France itself,
entailing those territories that belonged to the French colonial empire. On the other, most other
colonies coded as French civil law received the Civil Code through third countries or by own
initiative. Considering that each European colonial power applied a particular legal policy in its
empire, it is important to differentiate among them to better understand how the French civil law
was distributed around the world. Toward this end, we consider three categories of colonies
according to the way the civil law was transmitted to the recipient country. The first category
includes those colonies that directly received the French civil law by France itself. This group
contains 25 former French colonies in our sample. The second category consists of the former
Spanish colonies (18 countries), whereas a third group comprises the remaining colonies (18
countries).13
2.4.1. Implantation by France Itself
France conducted a uniform and rigid application of the law across its empire and did not
condition the implantation of the legal system on particular circumstances or endowments. Also,
the application of the French law was more ambitious than in the British case and reached a
higher percentage of people. Zweigert and Kötz (1998) state that “French colonial policy always
sought in the long run to assimilate the native populations” (p. 113) and Whittlesey (1937) notes
that “France is in Africa to make Frenchmen out of the Africans” (p. 367). The pursuit of legal
assimilation led the French colonial legislation to encourage the native population to adopt the
French law. While Britain applied the common law more flexibly and did not try to replace local
laws and indigenous customs, France imposed its Code rigidly despite conflicting with local
customs (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003a). In fact, this homogeneity in the application
of the law was accompanied by a similar administrative organization imposed on territories,
which were considered uniformly even when they presented special features (Crowder 1964).
This legal colonial policy was coherent with the nature and character of the French empire,
which was more centralized than the British and ruled with a very different ideology, namely,
the consideration of the colonial empire as an intrinsic part of the Republic and the ideal of
assimilation (Fieldhouse 1966; Kumar 2006). Referring to former French colonies, Whittlesey
(1937) notes that they “represent an extension of France not merely economically, but in every
phase of life” (p. 370). The French empire was based on centralized bureaucratic control of
13 Focusing on a different research question (the role of the colonizer vs. the legal family), Klerman et al. (2011)
divide the French civil law tradition into two groups (French colonies and the rest) and find that former French
colonies grew slower than the other French civil law colonies during the period 1960–2007.
13
colonial dominions and relied more on direct rule. Besides, it had clear formal rules and chains
of command, and indigenous chiefs were not considered an autonomous part in the system of
colonial control (Crowder 1964; Gann and Duignan 1967). In ideological terms, the French,
“inspired by egalitarian ideals of the Great Revolution and a belief in the superiority of
‘civilisation française’, constantly strove to lead the native population step by step to the higher
level of metropolitan culture” (Zweigert and Kötz 1998, p. 113). All these features led to a more
homogeneous colonial policy which was largely invariant to the level of endowments. 14
The uniformity in the exportation of the civil law to former colonies had as a consequence a
more homogeneous influence of the French civil law on colonial legal systems. Thus, the
typically negative outcomes associated with the French legal tradition –as held by the Legal
Origins Theory–, such as lower creditor and investor rights, higher legal formalism and lower
legal efficiency, are likely to apply to all former French colonies irrespective of their initial
endowments. We must add that the rigid implantation of the French civil law produced
widespread unreceptive transplants –as reflected in the coding of the legal transplant variable by
Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003a, b)–, which can also help explain the generally negative
effect found for this legal tradition. In this respect, it is important to stress that the French civil
law has had worse consequences in the colonies than in the origin country. This is because,
despite the fact that soon after the revolutionary period France relaxed the strict application of
the separation of powers and courts were granted the power to interpret laws, when exporting
their legal system the French did “not include the information [saying] that it really does not
work that way” (Merryman 1996, p. 116). This inhibited the development of the judicial system
in many developing countries.15
14 The different colonial strategies of France and Britain are reflected in the unequal presence of colonial officials in
the colonies. For instance, this presence was much larger in French West Africa than in British Nigeria. In the
1930s, the ratio of colonial officials per thousand population was 24/100 for the former while 7/100 for the latter
(Kirk-Greene 1980). In this sense, Whittlesey (1937) stated that “[t]he proportion of functionaries is therefore much
higher in the French possessions [than in the British]. Obviously more political officers are needed for direct than
for indirect government.” (pp. 367-8). In addition, the status and power of the chiefs also differ. According to the
Governor-General of French West Africa, Joost van Vollenhoven (1920), under French rule the chiefs “have no
power of their own, for there are not two authorities in the cercle [the district]...; there is only one! Only the
commandant du cercle commands; only he is responsible. The native chief is but an instrument, an auxiliary” (p.
207). In contrast to the British system of indirect rule stood “the French which tended to erode African authority,
finally making the administrator the responsible judicial official” (Betts 1985, p. 324).
15 Note that this constitutes another example of the problems arising when mixing origin countries with colonies. An
argument with similar implications is the one provided by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), who state that for countries
that choose their legal rules –like France– the civil law system may be efficient. However, when this legal tradition
is introduced into the colonies significant problems probably arise, due to higher government control over judges
and legal rules. Djankov et al. (2003a) also argue that the civil law is more problematic in the colonies than in
France.
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2.4.2. Spanish Law Legacy
In line with French colonization, Spain eliminated indigenous legal systems in the Spanish
American dominions (Fieldhouse 1966; Hanke 1949). However, there are two main distinctive
features that qualify Spanish American colonies for separate categorization: the enduring legacy
of the Spanish law tradition and the reception of the French Civil Code by imitation.16 Before
gaining independence, Spanish American colonies were ruled by Castilian kings over three
centuries, period over which they were subject to a continuous process of reception of the
Spanish law.17 Initially after conquest, Spain transplanted Castilian laws to the colonies, but over
time a special legislation was successively developed, which was compiled in the Recopilación
de las Indias, a collection of 6,000 statutes published by Charles II in 1680 that were applicable
to all the American colonies (Gacto, Alejandre, and García 2003).
When the Spanish American colonies achieved their independence at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the Spanish law was the basis of their legal systems. In this sense, William
W. Howe (1903) emphasized the key relevance of the Spanish law for Central and South
America, since all these countries derived their system of law and jurisprudence from Spain.18
The influence of the Spanish law in the American colonies provided a background of ius
commune that facilitated the reception of the French Civil Code and other European sources.
Many traditional concepts and ideas of the Civil Code, especially those coming from Roman
law, constituted no breach with the legal institutions established in Latin America. Therefore, the
shared Roman roots of the Spanish and French legal traditions favored the reception of the Civil
Code (Zweigert and Kötz 1998; Garro 1992; Mirow 2004).
16 An additional distinctive feature that differentiates these countries from the other French civil law countries is
their mixed influences, because legislators have increasingly incorporated –particularly over the twentieth century–
other legal sources such as the American, German, Italian or Swiss law (for example, Zweigert and Kötz 1998;
Garro 1992; Roe and Siegel 2009). Also, a key characteristic of Spanish colonial domination of overseas colonies
entailed the legal imposition of the Roman Catholic doctrine and forced conversions or punishment of non-Catholics
(Fieldhouse 1966; Burns 1973; Schmidhauser 1992).
17 It is well-known the fact that the Spanish law tradition is singular in the sense that it has its own history and
idiosyncratic features. For instance, Hamilton (1917) stated that the “Spanish Civil Law is the most influential body
of law on the globe today [...] It is no copy of the Code Napoleon, although that was carefully consulted”. Its
singularity comes from the Spanish history and one can find on it “a Roman foundation, Gothic, Moslem, local and
maritime elements” (p. 317). Brown (1956) places the Spanish law system in a middle point between the English
doctrine of precedent and the French position.
18 According to Mirow (2001), the study of the Castilian law Las Siete Partidas was used, for example, together
with the French Civil Code, in the drafting of the prestigious Chilean Civil Code. Dam (2006) also emphasizes the
importance of Spanish elements existing in Latin American law. Along similar lines, Peter J. Hamilton (1917)
stressed that the Spanish law continues to control the civil relations of Central and South American countries. He
pointed out that the Recopilación de las Indias still has great value for American countries and even compares the
legacy of Spain in Latin America with that of Rome in Europe.
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The second feature shared by former Spanish American colonies is the specific way in which
the French civil law was received. These territories achieved their independence before Spain
adopted a French oriented code. Thus, they received the French civil law by imitation, that is,
through voluntary transplant, which increases the chances of receptivity by allowing the
adaptation of foreign law to national circumstances (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003a). The
civil codes of Argentina and Chile exemplify the adaptation of foreign law to local conditions
and were taken as referential legal sources by many other Latin American countries (Mirow
2001; Zweigert and Kötz 1998).19
For all these reasons, it is clear that the reception of the French civil law in Spanish America
differed markedly from that in other regions such as West and Central Africa. The substance of
the law is also different because in the latter legal systems are impregnated with African and
tribal customs, whereas in the former with the Spanish legal culture. Therefore, legal systems in
countries that belonged to the Spanish empire are arguably more developed and effective than
those of former French colonies. Regarding the influence of endowments on the implantation of
the law, Spain –like France– applied legal rules homogeneously and in a centralized way across
its empire. This led to a uniform introduction of the Spanish-Roman oriented law and created
similar conditions among the colonies for the reception of the French Civil Code, which implies
a constant effect of the Spanish law legacy irrespective of initial endowments.
2.4.3. Others
We create a third group that entails those territories that were colonies of countries other than
France and Spain. This is a heterogeneous group of French civil law countries that comprises
territories as diverse as the British mandates of the League of Nations for the Middle East, the
Portuguese colonies or the Belgian, Dutch and Italian colonies. Given the small number of
observations in each sub-category, bringing together colonies of such diverse origin into a
residual group, though not ideal, may be the best available option. In addition, by creating this
residual group we do not mix these countries with former French and Spanish colonies, which
allows for a clearer analysis of the distribution of the civil law in both groups. Regarding the
distribution of the law in this third group, we lack an appropriate theory accounting for the way
each of these colonial powers implanted their legal systems. Since there is nothing indicating
19 Hence, the French civil law was not introduced (adopted) exogenously within this group of colonies, which is a
point that merits special consideration and further justifies its categorization as a separate group. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that Spain did impose its Roman oriented law on these countries. Therefore, in a broad sense the
civil law itself is exogenous to former Spanish American colonies.
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that the implantation of the law by these countries followed a systematic pattern, we expect no
specific relationship between the distribution of the civil law and initial endowments.
Finally, after reviewing how legal traditions were spread around the world in the colonization
process, one can still wonder about the ultimate cause of the different colonial legal policies
followed by European countries. In particular, why did Britain but not France pursue a more
sensitive policy to the presence of indigenous population and native rules? Colonial policies
were congruent with the general character of the French and British empires, the former being
more centralized and uniform and the latter more decentralized and variable to local conditions
(Fieldhouse 1966). However, the question that remains unanswered is why these empires differ.
A plausible answer lies in the specific domestic conditions prevailing in each country. The
centralist state tradition, the ideological heritage of the Great Revolution, their taste for
homogeneity and rationalization were all reflected in the nature of the French colonial empire
(Whittlesey 1937). In the case of Britain, their conservatism and preference for gradual changes,
their liberalism and a higher economic motivation led to a more pragmatic and variable colonial
empire (Fieldhouse 1973). Therefore, French and British imperialism needs to be related to their
domestic history (Kumar 2006).20
3. Empirical Approach and Data Issues
In order to analyze the patterns of distribution of the British common law and the French civil
law we estimate cross-section regressions for a sample of 100 former colonies. An interaction
model is used to allow for the possibility of heterogeneity in the relationship between
endowments and legal outcomes across legal traditions.21 The French civil law group is divided
into three categories depending on the way the Civil Code was received. Thus, the model to be
estimated is as follows:
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where legal_outcomes represents the specific indicator of legal outcomes; α is the constant
term; implantation_France, Spanish_law and Others are dummy variables capturing the civil
law categories ‘Implantation by France’, ‘Spanish law legacy’ and ‘Others’ (taking the British
20 For an elaboration and empirical testing of these arguments, see Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2013).
21 Other authors studying the influence of legal origin and endowments on institutions and financial development
use linear models, which render constant effects for legal traditions (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003a;
Levine 2005; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005).
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common law as the reference group, reflected in the constant term); endowlawcommon _ ,
endowFranceonimplantati _ , endowlawSpanish _ , and endowOthers  represent the
respective interaction terms of the common law and civil law groups with the endowments
indicator; and εi is the error term. Equation (1) is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
This model allows us to test four predictions derived directly from the discussion in the
previous section about the distribution of legal traditions. First, the implantation of the common
law was unequal among British colonies, with the transfer of legal rules and institutions being
inversely related to the presence of native population. Therefore, we expect to find a statistically
significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term endowlawcommon _ (or positive
when higher scores in the legal variable imply worse outcomes). Second, the uniform
implantation of the civil law by France in its colonies must be associated with a constant effect
by the ‘Implantation by France’ group, that is, the absence of a systematic relationship between
endowments and legal outcomes. Regarding the two other French civil law groups, particularly
the ‘Spanish law legacy’ group, for the reasons given above we also expect a constant effect on
legal outcomes.
Third, the model also enables us to test the relative performance of the common law vs. the
French civil law categories at different levels of endowments. This can be done by comparing
the predicted values of legal outcomes for each legal tradition both at low and high levels of
precolonial population density. Since the implantation of the common law was more effective in
sparsely populated territories, we expect differences between this legal family and the French
civil law categories to be larger at low levels of precolonial population density. Fourth,
confronting the coefficients on the dummy variables implantation_France and Spanish_law, we
can test whether –according to our view– ‘Spanish law legacy’ is associated with better legal
outcomes than the ‘Implantation by France’ group.
Concerning the selection of dependent variables, we rely on the Doing Business Project (2012)
dataset for the legal and regulatory indicators. This dataset is built following the methodology
developed in their papers by such prominent authors as Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, Vishny and others. A very important advantage of using this source versus the original
papers’ data is the much wider coverage of countries, feature that is central given our focus only
on former colonies. Further advantages are the update of the dataset and enhanced coverage in
terms of indicators in addition to improvements to the methodology and the correction of coding
errors and inconsistencies in the data. Doing Business provides indicators on eleven different
topics of business regulations. In order to proceed with the selection of indicators, we consider
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three important dimensions of legal rules/outcomes that have been intensively studied in the
legal origins literature: a) creditor and investor rights and disclosure, b) legal system efficiency,
and c) regulation. From each dimension, we select the most relevant or comprehensive
indicators available.
Regarding the first dimension, we select the indicator “Strength of legal rights index”, denoted
by creditor rights, which measures the extent to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect
borrowers and lenders’ rights. Another important indicator considered is “Strength of investor
protection index” (hereafter investor protection), which assesses the strength of minority
shareholder protection against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain and self-
dealing in related-party transactions. Both indicators range from 0 to 10, with higher scores
implying better designed laws to expand access to credit as well as to protect investors. They are
clear examples of “law on the books” indicators. The third indicator within this dimension is
“Depth of credit information index” (hereafter information sharing) that measures –on a scale
from 0 to 6– rules and practices affecting the scope, coverage and accessibility of credit
information either through a public credit registry or a private credit bureau, with higher values
reflecting more information available.
Concerning the second dimension, we select two legal outcome indicators. First, “time required
to complete procedures” (henceforth contract enforcement) indicates the time (in days) to
resolve a commercial sale dispute through the courts. According to Djankov, McLiesh, and
Shleifer (2007), this indicator can be considered as an objective measure of efficiency of contract
enforcement by courts. Second, “recovery rate” measures the present value of debt recovered by
creditors in insolvency proceedings, after deducting the official costs of the proceedings and the
loss of value due to assets depreciation. This variable can be considered as a measure of
efficiency of debt enforcement. Regarding the third dimension, the regulatory indicators selected
are “number of days required to register a firm” (henceforth starting a business) and “number of
days required to register property” (hereafter registering a property).22
22 The year of measurement is 2006, the first for which data are available for all selected variables. As pointed out
below, the results are robust to employing legal outcomes data for the year 2010 or an average over the period 2006-
2010. Logarithmic transformation is applied to indicators measured in days in order to reduce the high variability in
the data. In the absence of a comprehensive indicator that measures the different aspects of a dimension by
aggregating other indicators (for example, creditor rights), we prefer indicators measuring the duration of
procedures since this is a fundamental feature of legal and judicial systems, which is reflected in the principle
“justice delayed is justice denied”. Thus, for instance, Djankov et al. (2008a) use days to enforce a contract as a
measure of the quality of the legal system. In addition, Spamann (2010b) argues that measures of complexity, such
as the number of steps, have an unclear meaning because they combine and uniformly weight disparate steps that
differ greatly in importance and length.
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The independent variables are the legal origin dummies and the endowments indicator. Our
sample of former colonies contains only countries with the British common law and the French
civil law.23 We obtain these variables from La Porta et al. (1999), who identify the legal origin of
the Company Law or Commercial Code in each country. Regarding the measure of endowments,
our preferred choice is the logarithm of population density in 1500 (also referred to as
precolonial or indigenous population density) from AJR (2002). As argued in Section 2, this was
an important factor that influenced the colonial strategies of European powers when transferring
their legal rules and institutions to colonized territories. Another advantage of indigenous
population density over other alternatives is its availability for a larger cross-section of
countries.24 We refer the reader to Table A1 in the Appendix for descriptions and sources of the
rest of the variables. Table A2 in the Appendix contains the list of former colonies categorized
by legal traditions.
4. Regression Analysis: Basic Results
Table 1 presents the basic results for the seven dependent variables. The first three columns
contain the variables related to creditor and investor rights and disclosure. Regarding creditor
rights and investor protection we observe that the civil law dummies exhibit negative and highly
significant coefficients, with the coefficient on ‘Implantation by France’ being larger in absolute
value. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction between the common law and precolonial
population density is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level or better, whereas the
coefficients on the interaction terms for ‘Implantation by France’ and ‘Spanish law legacy’ are
insignificant. This result supports our prediction about heterogeneity in the effect of the common
law, since this legal tradition leads to higher creditor and investor rights protection in sparsely
populated territories than in densely populated places. In contrast, for ‘Implantation by France’
and ‘Spanish law legacy’ creditor and investor rights do not vary significantly with the level of
endowments. The third group within the French civil law tradition (‘Others’) shows an
inconsistent coefficient on the interaction term, which appears negative and significant when the
dependent variable is creditor rights but insignificant for the case of investor protection. In the
bottom part of the table, we show the differences in predicted values between each civil law
group and the common law for a relatively high value of precolonial population density (a value
23 There are no colonies with the German and Scandinavian civil law families (LLS 2008).
24 Potential settler mortality rate, from AJR (2001), is another well-known indicator, but it implies a significant
reduction in the sample. In addition, it may be argued that due to the widespread use of quinine after 1850, tropical
disease declined in importance as an obstacle to European settlements (Olsson 2009), which means that settler
mortality may be less relevant for the imperialist wave of colonization. Notwithstanding, as pointed out below, the
main results obtained for precolonial population density hold when it is replaced by potential settler mortality.
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of 10 that represents the 87th percentile of the distribution). Comparing this information with the
coefficients on the civil law dummies, which stand for the differences with respect to the
common law when the log of population density is 0,25 we can observe that differences between
the common law and the civil law groups are substantially larger at low levels of population
density than at high levels.26
Column 3 reports the results for information sharing. In this case, the coefficient on the
‘Implantation by France’ dummy is only marginally significant, whereas the coefficient on
‘Spanish law legacy’ is positive and highly significant. Regarding the interaction terms, only for
common law countries do we observe a negative and significant relationship between
endowments and information sharing, which again gives support to our thesis about the presence
of heterogeneity in the distribution of legal traditions. Comparing the coefficient on the
‘Implantation by France’ dummy (–0.82) with the one provided at the bottom part of the table
(0.8), we observe that the common law is associated with higher information sharing than this
civil law category at a low level of population density, but the situation is reversed at a high level
of indigenous population density –though the difference is not statistically significant in this
case. Regarding the relative effect of the common law vs. ‘Spanish law legacy’, significantly
better outcomes are observed in the latter both at low and high levels of population density. This
evidence on the favorable effect of ‘Spanish law legacy’ on promoting information sharing
25 This corresponds to a value of precolonial population density of 1, which represents the 25th percentile of the
distribution.
26 According to equation (1), predicted values for the common law are calculated as: α + β4×ln(10). Concerning the
civil law groups, predicted values for ‘Implantation by France’ are obtained as: α + β1+ β5×ln(10), proceeding
accordingly for the two other civil law groups. The comparison of the coefficients on the civil law dummies with
those presented in the bottom part of the table reflects what happens to the relative scores in legal rules/outcomes
between civil law groups and the common law when increasing log precolonial population density by 1.48 standard
deviations (that is, (2.3–0)/1.55, where 1.55 is the standard deviation of the log of population density).
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complements the results by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), who find a positive impact
of the French civil law on the presence of public credit registries.27
Legal outcomes related to legal system efficiency are introduced in columns 4 and 5. As far as
contract enforcement is concerned, we observe that the civil law dummies are positive but
statistically insignificant (except for the group ‘Others’), thus indicating the absence of
significant differences between the common law and the ‘Implantation by France’ and ‘Spanish
law legacy’ groups at low levels of precolonial population density. The interaction term is
positive and highly significant for the common law and insignificant for the civil law groups.
This result reflects that, for common law countries, the higher the level of precolonial population
density the longer the interval of time required to enforce contracts through the courts and,
therefore, the lower the efficiency of the legal system. In the bottom part of the table, the
negative signs reflect that contract enforcement is faster in the civil law groups than in the
common law at high levels of population density, though the differences are significant only for
‘Implantation by France’. Regarding the other indicator of legal system efficiency, namely
recovery rate, the civil law dummies are negative and significant, with a notably smaller
coefficient for ‘Spanish law legacy’. The coefficient on the interaction between the common law
and indigenous population density is negative and significant, which implies that this legal
tradition leads to lower legal system efficiency where precolonial population density was higher.
In this case, the interaction term for ‘Implantation by France’ is positive and significant, whereas
for the other civil law groups the coefficients remain insignificant. Again, in the bottom part of
the table we observe that the common law is not associated with higher legal system efficiency
than the civil law tradition at high levels of precolonial population density (rather the opposite,
though the differences are statistically insignificant).
27 The better performance of ‘Spanish law legacy’ in information sharing is well reflected in a substantially higher
average value (4.9) with respect to ‘Implantation by France’ (1.2), the other French civil law group (1.6) and
common law countries (1.5). Given the different roles that legal traditions assign to government, we analyzed
separately the variables “public registry coverage” and “private bureau coverage”. We found that ‘Spanish law
legacy’ has much higher public registry coverage than the other legal traditions, whereas there are no significant
differences in private registry coverage. However, former French colonies appear to exhibit significantly lower
private registry coverage than the British, but no statistical differences exist in terms of public registry coverage.
Therefore, the common perception that civil law colonies exhibit significantly better public registry coverage vis-a-
vis common law colonies appears to be driven by the high coverage in former Spanish colonies. Besides, the
common law interacts negatively with precolonial population density only for the private credit bureau coverage,
whereas the coefficient on the respective interaction term is found insignificant for public credit registry. The reason
for this is that there are only three British common law colonies with a public credit registry (two of which have a
score on the variable close to zero). These results are not reported to conserve space, but they are available in the
unpublished appendix accompanying this paper.
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Finally, columns 6 and 7 use as dependent variables two indicators related to regulations:
starting a business and registering a property. The results appear in line with those in previous
columns. More specifically, the coefficient on the interaction between the common law and
population density is positive and significant, which means that the regulatory burden is
positively related to the level of precolonial population density in this legal tradition.
‘Implantation by France’ and ‘Spanish law legacy’ exhibit insignificant coefficients on the
interaction terms, whereas the group ‘Others’ presents a coefficient which is significantly
negative for starting a business but positive and insignificant for registering a property.
Concerning the differences in predicted values between the common law and the French civil
law categories, the regulatory burden is significantly lower for the former at a low level of
indigenous population density, since the significantly positive coefficient on the civil law
dummies reflects that common law countries spend less time completing the formalities required
to start a business and register a property. In contrast, at a high level of population density the
common law is not associated with less burdensome regulation than the French civil law groups.
The size of the coefficients suggest that precolonial population density exerts a remarkable
effect on legal rules/outcomes among common law countries. For instance, India has a high level
of precolonial population density of 3.165 (≈ ln(23.7)) and an intermediate score of creditor 
rights of 6. The coefficient on the interaction term in Table 1 indicates that if India had a
population density closer to that of Australia –3.65 (≈ ln(0.026)), then India would exhibit one 
and half times its current score of creditor rights. Concerning contract enforcement, the same
exercise would imply a substantial increase in the efficiency of the Indian legal system by
reducing the time to enforce a contract in approximately 1,000 days, thus rendering a score close
to Australia that entails 395 days.28
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In sum, Table 1 reveals four interesting results. First, the effect of the common law on legal
rules and outcomes is inversely related to the level of endowments. Second, there is no clear-cut
relationship between endowments and legal outcomes for the civil law groups. Third, common
law countries perform better than French civil law countries at low levels of population density,
whereas differences become smaller and in most cases statistically insignificant at high levels of
28 More specifically, ∆(creditor rights) = –0.438*∆(precolonial population density). India’s population density 
equals 3.17 and Australia’s –3.65. Then, ∆(creditor rights) = –0.438*(–6.82)= 2.99. As India’s creditor rights equals 
6, the new score would be 8.99. As regards contract enforcement, ∆(contract enforcement) = 0.176*∆(precolonial 
population density) = 0.176*(–6.82)= –1.2. Since India’s log of number of days to enforce a contract equals 7.26
(≈ln(1420)), its new level would be 6.06 (≈ln(428)), which implies a reduction of almost 1,000 days.
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population density. Fourth, ‘Spanish law legacy’ exhibits generally better legal outcomes than
‘Implantation by France’, as becomes apparent when comparing the coefficients on the dummy
variables.29 Thus, these results support our view regarding the presence of heterogeneity in the
distribution of the common law and the French civil law. In those places where the common law
was extensively implanted (that is, in sparsely populated territories at the time of colonization),
we observe the usual features associated with this legal tradition, such as higher creditor and
investor rights, more efficient legal systems and less burdensome regulation. In contrast, when
the introduction of the common law was superficial, as generally occurred in densely populated
areas where indigenous law and rules were already in place, legal systems that emerged are not
related (or related to a much lesser extent) to such features.30 As far as the civil law tradition is
concerned, the uniform distribution of the French civil law is reflected in a homogeneous effect
on legal rules irrespective of initial conditions.
At first glance, it may result striking that for five of the seven indicators the common law and
the French civil law produce similar outcomes in initially densely populated places. If, as is
widely recognized (Zweigert and Kötz 1998), the British were more respectful than the French to
indigenous rules and customs, why did the common law not produce better outcomes
everywhere? As argued in Section 2.3, in densely populated areas with unfavorable disease
conditions Britain applied an indirect form of government that, even though it did not try to
impose its legal system over the native population, had negative consequences for subsequent
institutional and legal development. Interestingly, the two indicators for which the common law
predicts higher scores at high levels of population density (creditor rights and investor
protection) are those more related to what is called “law on the books”, whereas the others are
more related to “law in action” or law enforcement. This fact is congruent with our story.
Although the application of indirect rule did not completely prevent the inclusion of some
29 For all the variables except contract enforcement, coefficients on the ‘Spanish law legacy’ dummy reflect better
legal outcomes than those on the ‘Implantation by France’ dummy. For investor protection, information sharing,
recovery rate and registering a property, differences are statistically significant. This result appears in line with
Merryman’s (1996) prediction that colonies receiving the French Civil Code directly from France itself did so more
rigidly and did not receive the blueprints of how courts could interpret the law rather than simply apply it, as
postulated by the revolutionary doctrine.
30 Regarding our results about the distribution of the common law, its relatively poorer performance in the presence
of adverse endowments can be related to the findings in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who provided evidence that
endowments mattered much more for institutions conducive to financial development than legal origin. Thus, when
the levels of indigenous population density or potential settler mortality are high, their negative effects appear to
dominate the positive effect from being a common law colony. Put it differently, as we find for the case of high
population density, the common law by itself does not guarantee the emergence of institutions supportive of high
legal system efficiency and a low regulatory burden.
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principles in legal provisions, this form of government undermined the foundations for creating
effective and efficient legal systems. The attribution of judicial powers to unconstrained chiefs,
which harmed the legitimacy of customary institutions, along with the inconsistencies derived
from a parallel jurisdictional system and the lack of an effective attempt to introduce European
legal procedures and institutions are likely reasons behind the poor performance in terms of law
enforcement of the common law in initially densely populated places. At the end, the result was
that the superficial implantation of the common law led to similar negative legal outcomes to the
more rigid transplantation of the French civil law.31
In all, our results do not appear to dispute Merryman’s (1996) prediction that it is better to have
a law integrated into existing legal and cultural norms (as occurred in the British settler colonies)
than having a law rigidly imposed on a society (as occurred in former French colonies).
However, what our analysis has uncovered is the fact that in those colonies where the common
law was superficially implanted and failed to integrate with local laws and indigenous customs
(as occurred in indirectly ruled British colonies), the differences in terms of legal outcomes with
respect to former French colonies vanish.
5. Sensitivity Analysis
5.1. Robustness Checks to Baseline Results
In this section we provide extensive robustness checks to the baseline results shown in Table 1.
For each dependent variable we conduct three types of robustness checks. Firstly, control
variables are incorporated into equation (1) to account for factors that may be correlated with our
independent variables and legal rules/outcomes, thereby causing omitted variable bias. ‘Years
since independence’ is a potential determinant of countries’ legal systems because a long
postcolonial period allows countries to adapt and develop legal rules and institutions according
to their needs and eliminate inefficiencies from their colonial past (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine 2003a). Religion is also considered as a possible factor affecting legal systems and
institutions. For example, historical hostility of some religions to lending on interest may have
31 It is also important to note that the common law is not a legal tradition easy to receive, since it consists of “a
matrix of case law and statutes” and involves a complex language (Glendon, Carozza, and Picker 2008). In fact,
according to Michaels (2009, p. 788), comparative lawyers have traditionally argued that “the civil law should travel
more easily than the common law, because its reliance on systematized codification requires less expertise in the
recipient country”, and it is known that “the transplantation of formal laws cannot succeed unless it comes with the
transport of legal expertise”. Thus, where the common law was superficially introduced and not complemented with
legal expertise, it is not surprising that we do not observe its generally claimed beneficial effects. Also, the proper
functioning of this legal tradition depends on the development of a body of judicial precedents, which is not easy to
materialize (Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe 1985). See also Joireman (2004) for the case of Kenya.
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influenced the protection of creditor rights (Stulz and Williamson 2003). We also control for the
vulnerability of the indigenous population to European diseases. As noted by Easterly and
Levine (2012), territories in the New World and Oceania experienced dramatic declines in the
native population, which could affect colonial policies.
Another important variable to take into account is ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which is
associated with the provision of public goods and the quality of institutions (Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly 1999; Alesina et al. 2003). We also control for a set of variables related to the economic
potential of the colonies: the number of years between when a territory was first sighted by
Western Europeans and when it was first colonized by a European power, with a shorter gap
implying that the territory was more valuable for the colonizer relative to the cost of colonizing it
(Woodberry 2004, 2012); an indicator of soil quality as a measure of land suitability for
intensive agriculture that may be necessary to sustain large populations (Lange 2009); and
landlockedness and distance from the coast as measures of a country’s permanent limitation to
access large markets and exploit scale economies in production (Sachs and Warner 1995;
Easterly and Levine 2003). In the main text we present the p-value associated with the joint
significance of these four controls, whereas the unpublished appendix contains the statistical
significance associated with each individual variable. In addition, the level of economic
development, measured by GDP per capita, is viewed as an important factor affecting many
legal outcomes (LLS 2008). However, controlling for this variable involves problems since it is
endogenous to legal rules. This may spuriously reduce the coefficient on the truly exogenous
independent variables, as argued in La Porta et al. (1999). To partially mitigate the endogeneity
of GDP per capita, we include its value for the year 1970 –though the same results follow if
measured in 2000. Moreover, as further control variables we add continental dummies for
Africa, America and Asia.
Secondly, we use the potential mortality rate of European settlers as an alternative endowments
indicator. Although we previously argued that precolonial population density is the best possible
indicator of endowments available, we find it appealing to check the empirical validity of our
baseline results to this alternative indicator introduced by AJR (2001). According to these
authors, a lower mortality rate implied higher feasibility of settlements by Europeans, which
resulted in better institutions transferred to the colonies, that is, those protecting property rights
and political freedom. In addition, a larger number of European settlers facilitated the
introduction and application of European laws in the colonies. Thirdly, we test whether our
results are driven by influential observations. We consider several statistical methods to identify
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outliers such as leverage, standardized residuals and Cook’s distance.32 Once outliers are
detected, we exclude these countries and rerun the regressions.
Tables 2 to 8 present the results from the application of all these robustness checks to the seven
indicators covering the dimensions creditor and investor rights, disclosure, legal system
efficiency and regulation. We anticipate that our previous findings are broadly confirmed. As
shown in Tables 2 and 3 for creditor and investor rights, the effect of the common law appears
negatively related to the level of precolonial population density.33 In contrast, endowments do
not play any role in explaining the effect of ‘Implantation by France’ and ‘Spanish law legacy’.
These diverging patterns among legal traditions are responsible for the fact that differences
between the common law and the civil law categories are larger at low levels of indigenous
population density than they are at high levels, as observed by comparing the coefficients on the
civil law dummies with those in the bottom part of the tables. It can also be noted that the
negative coefficients on the dummy variable for ‘Spanish law legacy’ are smaller than those for
‘Implantation by France’, thus supporting the existence of higher creditor and investor rights in
the former. Regarding information sharing (Table 4), we observe that the effect of the common
law is negatively related to endowments, whereas the interaction terms for the civil law groups
are always insignificant. Again, ‘Spanish law legacy’ is associated with deeper credit
information than the common law and the other civil law categories.
[Insert Tables 2 to 4 about here]
Tables 5 and 6 include contract enforcement and recovery rate as dependent variables and the
results appear in line with our baseline findings. In common law countries we consistently
observe for both indicators that the more adverse the endowments (as implied by higher values
of precolonial population density or settler mortality) the lower the legal system efficiency. In
civil law countries no significant relationship is observed, except for the ‘Implantation by
France’ group when recovery rate is the dependent variable. In this case, the coefficient on the
interaction term is positive, but shifts signs when settler mortality is used as endowment. Finally,
Tables 7 and 8 present the robustness checks for our regulation indicators: starting a business
and registering a property. As with the other legal indicators, we find evidence of heterogeneity
32 The cut-offs of the detection methods are: leverage, 2·k/n; standardized residuals, |2|; Cook’s distance, 4/n; where
k is the number of parameters and n is the number of observations. Similar results follow with the DFITS criterion.
33 Only in one specification does the interaction term lose the statistical significance. It is when we include GDP per
capita as a control variable for investor protection. However, we previously warned about the endogeneity problems
associated with this control variable, which may spuriously reduce the coefficient and significance of the truly
exogenous regressors.
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in the distribution of legal traditions. The positive and significant coefficient on the interaction
between the common law and endowments implies that the regulatory burden in common law
countries is positively related to the level of initial endowments, whereas for ‘Implantation by
France’ and ‘Spanish law legacy’ there is no clear evidence of such a relationship.
[Insert Tables 5 to 8 about here]
In summary, our basic findings shown in Table 1 are robust to the inclusion of additional
control variables,34 the use of the potential settler mortality rate as an alternative endowments
indicator and the exclusion of outliers. As further unreported robustness checks, we run all
regressions –and not just the basic specification– using the potential settler mortality rate, and it
is remarkable that the baseline results broadly hold. Moreover, to be sure that our findings are
not affected by the residual category of French civil law countries ‘Others’, we redid the analysis
without the 18 countries belonging to that group. Remarkably, the results remain fairly robust
with the reduced sample of colonies. Finally, the baseline results are also robust to employing
legal rules/outcomes data for the year 2010 or an average over the period 2006-2010. In support
of the presence of higher heterogeneity in the distribution of the common law vs. the civil law
categories, we also show that the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of each
dependent variable is generally higher in the common law than in the ‘Implantation by France’
and ‘Spanish law legacy’ groups.35
5.2. Using Business and Household Survey Data on Legal Outcomes
In this subsection we complement the previous analysis that employed rule-based indicators of
legal and regulatory institutional structures from Doing Business with a wide array of de facto
indicators measuring how firms and households perceive and experience the legal and regulatory
systems. The use of outcome-based legal indicators derived from the direct experience of firms
and households enables us to better measure the consequences arising from the actual
implementation and enforcement of laws in practice. Several sources of enterprise and household
survey data are employed. Concerning the former, we use the Enterprise Surveys (ES) and the
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) of the World Bank Group (see World Bank
34 Of all controls, the set of economic potential indicators and GDP per capita appear significantly related to better
legal institutions for five of the seven dependent variables, while the continental dummies are statistically significant
for four, years since independence for three and religion for only two.
35 For reasons of space, all these results are not reported but are available in the unpublished appendix.
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[2013] and Kaufmann and Stone [2003], respectively). As for the latter, we employ data from the
Gallup World Poll –GWP hereafter– (2013) and the World Justice Project (WJP).36
As mentioned in the ES homepage, data from ES and WBES (obtained from face-to-face
interviews with managers) are highly complementary to Doing Business data (obtained from
local experts on a specific legal/regulation area). Whereas the latter measures what a
standardized firm should expect if it complies with all official regulations and legal requirements
in place, the former measures the actual experiences of a firm regarding a particular legal or
regulatory aspect in the normal course of business, which does not necessarily entail the full
compliance or enforcement of the laws and regulations in place. The variables we select from the
surveys are those that better reflect firms’ (and households’ when it comes to household surveys)
view on the quality of courts, enforcement of regulations, and other aspects related to the
availability of information on laws and regulations and their actual consistency and
predictability. More specifically, the indicator taken from ES relates to firms’ assessment of
whether courts are fair, impartial and uncorrupted. From WBES, which contains a larger number
of indicators of legal outcomes, we retrieve the following measures: availability of information
on laws and regulations, interpretation of laws and regulations are consistent, overall quality and
efficiency of courts, courts are fair and impartial, courts are honest and uncorrupted, and court
decisions are enforced.37
As far as household surveys data are concerned, we employ an indicator of confidence in the
judicial and security systems constructed on the basis of the following subject areas considered
by the GWP: confidence in the police force, confidence in the judicial system, have you had
money property stolen from you or another household member?, and have you been assaulted or
mugged? In addition, we employ the following WJP indicators related to regulatory enforcement
and civil justice functioning and enforcement: government regulations are effectively enforced,
government regulations are applied and enforced without improper influence, civil justice is free
36 The ES and WBES are conducted for a large number of firms in the main sectors of economic activity in a large
number of countries. Other papers using WBES data are Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Maksimovic (2005), and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2005). The GWP is a survey polling representative
samples of households in a large sample of countries, and the WJP is a survey that combines expert opinion with
rigorous polling of 1,000 general public respondents in a large sample of countries (Botero and Ponce 2010). In the
four cases, we take averages of the scores obtained for all units surveyed in each country.
37 The ES indicator ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), and the WBES indicators’ scores range
from 1 (fully agree) to 6 (fully disagree). We rescale WBES indicators so that higher scores imply better legal and
regulatory outcomes for the respondents. Since the average for each country is calculated from microdata, the
regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the mean values for each country, thus taking into
account the precision of the average values estimated.
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of improper government influence, civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delays, civil justice
is effectively enforced, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible, impartial,
and effective.38
Table 9 presents the baseline results for the 14 survey-based legal/regulatory indicators. As with
Doing Business data, we find strong evidence of heterogeneity in the effect of legal traditions on
legal outcomes, since the coefficient on the interaction between the common law and
endowments is consistently negative and significant, whereas the respective coefficient for the
civil law groups is generally insignificant. This implies that the common law leads to better legal
and regulatory outcomes at low levels of indigenous population density, whereas at high levels
the difference with the civil law groups generally vanishes (as presented in the bottom panel of
the table). This makes us confident that what we are capturing is not an artifact caused by the use
of rule-based indicators, but it represents the distinct influence that legal traditions and their
interaction with initial endowments exert on the actual experiences of firms and households in
their dealings with the courts and the legal and regulatory system (that is, on law in action).
[Insert Table 9 about here]
6. Exploring the Mechanisms
In the previous section we provided evidence that the level of endowments is negatively related
to current legal rules and outcomes in British common law colonies, whereas they appear
unrelated in former French and Spanish civil law colonies. We explained the results on the basis
of the differences in response of western powers’ colonial strategies to the level of endowments
present in the colonies, with the British colonial strategy being the only one responsive to
endowments. In this section, we build on these arguments and try to trace the link between initial
endowments and current legal rules/outcomes through the colonial strategy. Since British
common law colonies are the only group for which current legal rules/outcomes are clearly
related to the level of endowments, we build our identification strategy with this group in mind.
Also related is the great variability in colonial arrangements found in the British Empire relative
to the French and Spanish empires. In short, direct rule prevailed in extreme form in the case of
the settler colonies of North America and Australasia that attracted massive European
immigration and featured representative constitutional systems. Direct rule was also prevalent in
38 The use of the latter indicator constitutes a novelty in the literature that has focused exclusively on public contract
enforcement institutions. This variable is related to private arrangements for dispute resolution and allows us to shed
some light on the effect of legal traditions on households’ perceptions about the functioning of institutions of private
contract enforcement. See Beck (2012) for a discussion about the need to complement the use of indicators of public
institutions outcomes with those of private legal mechanisms for conflict resolution.
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two types of colonies despite not having attracted a large number of European settlers: the
strategically trade-oriented colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore and the plantation colonies of
the West Indies.39 At the other end, indirect rule was widespread among extractive colonies,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of Asia, although implemented in different
degrees depending on their initial endowments (Lange 2004, 2009). Somewhere in the middle, a
hybrid form of colonialism was present in colonies like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and
India (Lange et al. 2006).
As emphasized by Lange (2009, p. 28), while direct rule “entails the construction of a complete
system of colonial domination in which both local and central institutions are well integrated and
governed by the same authority and organization principles”, indirect rule implies “domination
via collaborative relations between a dominant colonial center and several regionally based
indigenous institutions”. The latter led to a bifurcated form of rule: one dominated by local
chiefs that ruled the countryside, and another controlled by the tiny colonial administration that
normally lacked state capacity to rule beyond the colonial capital city. In contrast, in directly
ruled areas, the colonial legal-administrative apparatus was more centralized and bureaucratized,
and could broadcast power throughout an entire territory (system of “integrated domination”
versus that of “dispersed domination” in indirectly ruled areas, –see Migdal [1994]; Lange
[2009]). Social and society-state relations are regulated countrywide by the same rules, which
are enforced by courts presided over by British officials and are entirely based on British
colonial law. Whereas direct rule enabled colonies to build legal-administrative capacity through
centralization, bureaucratic organization and inclusiveness, which is required for the provision of
basic public goods and maintenance of law and order, indirect rule led to ineffective states that
lacked infrastructural power and bureaucratization (Lange 2009).40
To operationalize the identification strategy we need to employ a suitable measure of the extent
of direct/indirect rule in each colony, which can account for the main differences in terms of
their legal-administrative apparatus. For that purpose, we employ the ratio of colonially
39 Direct rule was also instituted in Sri Lanka (Lange 2009) and Papua New Guinea (Ottley 1995).
40 Even if one might be inclined to think that indirect rule ended when the British left the colonies, in the
postcolonial period many native governance and legal structures employed to maintain order and enforce law in the
countryside have persisted. This has been particularly the case in former African colonies, where the postcolonial
state has been unable to control territories far from the capital (Bates 1983; Herbst 2000; Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou 2013a). Acemoglu et al. (2014) point out that indirect rule strengthened local elites, who were largely
unaccountable to their people, and undermined the colonial and postcolonial central state that was non-
bureaucratized, lacked a monopoly of violence and a well-functioning fiscal system, thus failing to provide even the
most basic public goods. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) provide evidence consistent with these claims for
Sierra Leone.
31
recognized customary court cases over the total number of court cases in 1955, with the latter
comprising both customary court cases heard by native chiefs and magistrate court cases handled
by British officials.41 It captures the extent to which British colonial rule hinged on customary
legal institutions to regulate social relations, thereby providing an indirect measure of the size of
the legal-administrative apparatus of the local traditional administration versus the central
colonial administration. Therefore, in directly ruled areas, where magistrate courts presided over
by colonial officials applied the British common law uniformly across the whole territory, this
measure should take a value of zero.
According to our theory, what lies between colonies’ initial endowments and their current legal
institutions/outcomes is the form of colonialism implemented and, in turn, the type of legal-
administrative institutions present in colonial times. Therefore, our identification strategy based
on a Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) framework is simple. In a first stage, we try to explain the
extent of indirect rule on the basis of initial endowments (precolonial population density and
settler mortality) and early European settlement.42 As argued in Section 2.3, such initial
conditions could affect the type of colonial strategy that Britain followed. The first stage is
represented by the following specification:
iiiii XsettlementEuropeanearlyendowmentscourtscustomary  
'
210 (2)
where customary courts stands for the extent of indirect rule, endowments represents
precolonial population density or potential mortality rate of European settlers, early European
settlement reflects the European population share in 1900, and X represents a set of exogenous
variables capturing the economic potential of a colony from the perspective of the colonizer (the
gap between first sighted and colonized, soil quality, landlockedness and distance from the
coast).
41 These data are collected by Lange (2004, 2009) from annual colonial reports, annual judicial reports and other
primary sources. When colonies gained independence prior to 1955, he takes the latest available colonial-era data.
42 Lange (2004, 2009) forcefully argues for including European settlement in the set of explanatory factors of the
extent of indirect rule. This is because the number of European settlers is one of the factors (though not the only
one) responsible for the implementation of direct or indirect forms of colonialism. Note, for instance, the case of the
settler colonies for which a reception of a large mass of European immigrants was key to the implementation of
direct rule and the full implantation of the common law, as it was applied to people who already knew the basic
principles. This contrasts with the plantation colonies in the West Indies that received much less European
immigration, probably due to the adverse disease conditions to settlement, but were also directly ruled. However,
instead of employing an instrumental variables framework to build an identification strategy in similar spirit to ours,
Lange (2004, 2009) runs OLS regressions of postcolonial political and development outcomes on the extent of
indirect rule, which is considered exogenous and appears included in the same specification along with other
possible determinants of indirect rule such as precolonial population density or European settlement.
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In a second stage, we regress our seven Doing Business legal and regulatory indicators on the
extent of indirect rule as well as on a set of exogenous controls capturing the economic potential
of the colonies before colonization. The second-stage specification is as follows:
iiii Xcourtscustomaryoutcomelegal  
'
10_ (3)
Endowments and early European settlement are considered exogenous regressors employed to
extract the exogenous component of colonial strategy and, as such, they are excluded from the
second stage. The exclusion restriction entails that, conditional on the controls included in the
regression, initial endowments and early European settlement do not affect current legal
outcomes directly, but through their impact on the colonial strategy. In other words, our
instruments must be uncorrelated with any other determinants of legal outcomes as follows:
0),( iisinstrumentcorr  . The results of the overidentification test are presented in Panel C of
Table 10.43 If the results indicate that the extent of indirect rule instrumented through
endowments and early European settlement is significant after controlling for colonies’
economic potential, we would be ruling out the possibility that colonies with better initial
conditions developed faster for other reasons than the colonial strategy implemented, and thus
could afford to have more effective legal institutions over the colonial and postcolonial periods.
The result of the first stage is presented in Panel B of Table 10 for the case in which
precolonial population density is the only instrument for the extent of indirect rule and the case
in which the instruments are precolonial population density and the European population share in
1900.44 In both first stages, precolonial population density is significantly and positively
associated with the extent of indirect rule. When early European settlement is incorporated into
the instrument set, this variable enters significantly with a negative sign, indicating that higher
European immigration to the colonies led to more direct forms of rule. Regarding the controls for
colonies’ economic potential, landlockedness, higher distance from the coast and lower land
suitability for agriculture lead to more indirect forms of colonialism. Turning to the 2SLS
estimate of the effect of the extent of indirect rule on current legal rules/outcomes, Panel A of
Table 10 shows strong evidence of a highly significant effect operating in the expected direction
43 The conclusions from this analysis must be tempered due to the limited number of observations available, which
prevented us from including more controls beyond measures of colonies’ economic potential.
44 We leave for the unpublished appendix the case in which settler mortality is added to the instrument set since it
reduces the sample of British colonies from 37 to 25. Notwithstanding, the results are fairly robust to this change.
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in all 14 cases. Similar results presented in the unpublished appendix would also follow if we
employ OLS to estimate Panel A of Table 10.45
Panel C provides the p-value from the 2 over-identification test for the specification with two
instruments, which serves as a general test for their overall validity. The result of the test appears
to favor our identification strategy, as we fail to reject the null hypothesis even at the 10% level
irrespective of the legal rules/outcomes employed. This holds when potential settler mortality is
added to the instrument set for six of the seven dependent variables. This suggests that initial
endowments and early European settlement may affect current legal outcomes via the colonial
form of rule implemented in former British colonies.
A final check is presented in Panel D, where the European population share in 1960 is included
as an exogenous control in the second stage. If the effect we are capturing represents simply the
fact that those countries with a higher presence of modern-day descendants of European settlers
are more likely to implant the common law than societies with more modern-day descendants of
the indigenous population –that may be more adept at implementing legal practices based on
native rules and customary courts– (as suggested by Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard 2003a, b), the
European population share in 1960 should enter with a significantly positive coefficient and
indirect rule should become insignificant. It is worth highlighting that the customary courts
indicator remains highly significant for each of the seven current legal rules/outcomes, whereas
the European population share in 1960 is marginally significant in only four cases (out of 14)
and enters with the wrong sign. This supports the fact that if European settlement has an effect
on current legal outcomes is through its impact on the colonial strategy followed, rather than
directly. Of course keeping in mind that colonial legal-administrative structures were in most
cases maintained after independence, which have led to the persistence of inclusive institutions
45 The impact of precolonial population density working through indirect rule on current legal rules/outcomes is not
trivial. For instance, if we consider the specification in column 1 (Panel A, Table 10), increasing precolonial
population density one standard deviation (1.55) should reduce creditor rights by 1.55*γ1*δ1, where γ1 is the effect
of population density on customary courts and δ1 is the effect of customary courts on creditor rights. Thus, the
estimated effect of indigenous population density on creditor rights running through indirect rule is 1.55*9.95*(–
0.05) = –0.77. Remarkably, this appears similar to the reduced-form effect of precolonial population density on
creditor rights from a comparable specification (Table 2, column 5), which equals –0.76 (obtained by multiplying
the standard deviation of indigenous population density times the coefficient on the interaction term between
population density and the common law). This appears to support our argument that the reduced-form effect of
indigenous population density on current legal institutions works through the form of rule that Britain imposed in its
colonies.
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in most directly ruled colonies over the postcolonial era, while extractive and clientelistic ones in
indirectly ruled colonies.46
[Insert Table 10 about here]
We next provide a preliminary falsification test to show that, unlike the British, French
colonial rule did not respond to the level of endowments. Since Lange’s measure of the extent of
indirect rule is not available for former French colonies, we employ instead the number of
Africans per European administrator, with a higher value implying a more indirect form of rule.
This variable is taken from Richens (2009) and is available for 33 sub-Saharan former colonies.
As shown in the unpublished appendix, initial endowments appear unrelated to the number of
Africans per administrator in the French sample of colonies, whereas they appear significantly
and positively related to that variable in the group of former British colonies.
Before concluding, we also test whether indirect rule worked worse in those places with
fragmented and acephalous societies that lacked precolonial centralized polities –since the
British granted authority to “warrant chiefs” that lacked legitimacy to their people and distorted
customary law and the functioning of native courts– versus those territories with societies
exhibiting centralized authority and administrative and judicial institutions –where the British
could incorporate legitimate native rulers into the colonial administration structure. Toward this
end, we run simple OLS regressions of current legal outcomes on the extent of indirect rule,
precolonial centralization and their interaction.47 The results reported in the unpublished
appendix indicate that the negative effect of the customary courts indicator on current legal
outcomes is reduced as the level of precolonial centralization rises, which is consistent with our
arguments. This holds in the case of four of the seven legal indicators employed.48 This result
somehow allows us to reconcile the view on the adverse effects of indirect rule on postcolonial
46 Our cross-country evidence favoring the system of direct rule in British colonies appears in line with the within-
country findings for the case of British India provided by Banerjee and Iyer (2005). They find that a cultivator-based
land revenue system, where the ruler is in charge of collecting the revenue directly from cultivators, led to
significantly higher agricultural investments and productivity as well as higher investments in education and health
in the post-independence period than a landlord-based revenue system, in which the revenue collection is assigned
to landlords. This suggests that a system of direct taxation was superior to a system of indirect taxation exercised via
powerful landlords.
47 Precolonial centralization is measured through a country’s percentage of population that belonged to centralized
ethnic groups, as in Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). Since that measure is only provided for sub-Saharan African
countries, we compute it for the remaining former British colonies using the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and the
Ethnographic Atlas of Murdock (1967).
48 See Richens (2009) for a similar result but for a sample of 33 sub-Saharan African colonies, with economic
growth entering as the dependent variable and the number of Africans per colonial administrator measuring the
extent of indirect rule.
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development (Lange 2004, 2009; Mamdani 1996, among others) with the view on the positive
impact of having precolonial centralization versus fragmentation on subsequent development
(Gennaioli and Rainer 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013b).
7. Conclusions
According to LLS (2008), four propositions are correct regarding the Legal Origins Theory:
“First, legal rules and regulations differ systematically across countries [...] Second, these
differences in legal rules and regulations are accounted for to a significant extent by legal
origins. Third, the basic historical divergence in the styles of legal traditions [...] explains well
why legal rules differ. Fourth, the measured differences in legal rules matter for economic and
social outcomes.” (p. 326). Our paper qualifies points two and three. “[D]ifferences in legal rules
and regulations” depend not just on legal origins but also on the way the mother country
implanted the legal system in the recipient country. Incorporating this additional dimension is
crucial to understand the relation between legal origins and legal rules. In fact, our results
indicate that the superior performance of the common law is largely driven by countries where
Britain extensively implanted its legal tradition. But in those places where the common law was
hardly introduced, this legal tradition is not generally associated with better legal outcomes than
the French civil law. Thus, to explain “why legal rules differ” one must consider both the
contents or styles of legal traditions and the way they were distributed by the origin countries.
We argue that the process of distribution of the common law differed from that of the French
civil law. The implantation of the common law was not uniform because Britain conducted a
colonial strategy that did not seek to transfer its legal rules and institutions to territories
politically organized and densely populated at the time of colonization, which normally had their
own native rules. In contrast, France did introduce its legal system uniformly in its empire,
irrespective of the initial conditions in each territory. This was due to the particular features of
the French colonial empire, its centralism and bureaucratic control, and the ideology of
assimilation that impregnated its colonial policy. We further argue that, by paying attention to
the distribution of the French legal tradition, one can divide this legal family into three
categories, depending on the way the Civil Code was received. In support of the claim that the
French Civil Code was better received in Spanish American colonies than in French colonies, we
generally observe that the former group enjoys higher creditor and investor rights and a more
efficient legal system than the latter.
The Legal Origins Theory has deeply influenced our understanding about how to improve legal
systems in order to foster financial development and promote economic activity. The pretended
36
superiority of the common law in many areas of the legal system advocated by the extant legal
origins literature has had important consequences. Policy makers in the law-making sphere
imitate tools related to the common law (“the winning origin”) by adopting, for instance, private
micro-institutions of investor protection instead of improving existing institutions of public
enforcement through securities laws (Roe and Siegel 2009). If, as shown in this article, the
common law does not systematically lead to better legal rules and institutions than the French
civil law, then it is not clear that adopting common law tools will improve the performance and
efficiency of the legal system. Additional considerations beyond formal rules need to be raised,
some of them related to factors that were present when legal traditions were implanted. For
example, the rigid application of the Civil Code by France led to collisions with local rules that
resulted in illegitimate legal systems, whereas the empowerment of local elites in indirectly ruled
British colonies led to abuse of power and perversion of traditional customs. These colonial
legacies surely contribute to some extent to the fact that at least eighty percent of the population
in many developing countries –particularly in Africa– resolves their disputes using traditional
mechanisms outside the official legal system (Daniels, Trebilcock, and Carson 2011). Many of
these problems rooted historically in the distant past are still undermining the development of
legal systems in many nations. Providing a satisfactory solution to them may have more to do
with adapting or improving existing rules and institutions than with imitating other legal
traditions.
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Appendix
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variables
Creditor rights The strength of legal rights index. According to the Doing Business’ methodology, this index
“measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and
lenders. It includes eight aspects related to legal rights in collateral law and two aspects in
bankruptcy law. A score of 1 is assigned for each of such aspects of the laws considered.” The
indicator ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores implying higher creditor rights.
Doing Business Project
(2012)
(www.doingbusiness.org)
Investor protection The strength of investor protection index. According to the Doing Business’ methodology, this
indicator “measures the strength of minority shareholder protections against directors’ misuse of
corporate assets for personal gain. It distinguishes three dimensions of investor protections:
transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure index), extent of liability for self-
dealing (extent of director liability index) and shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for
misconduct (the ease of shareholder suits index). The strength of investor protection index averages
the three indices and ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more investor protection.”
Doing Business Project
(2012)
Information
sharing
The depth of credit information index. According to the Doing Business’ methodology, this indicator
“measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information
available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau. A score of 1 is assigned
for each of the six features of the public credit registry or private credit bureau (or both).” The
indicator ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values reflecting more information available.
Doing Business Project
(2012)
Contract
enforcement
Time (in days) to enforce contracts. We apply the logarithmic transformation. This is a measure of the
efficiency of the judicial system in resolving a commercial dispute. According to the Doing Business’
methodology, it “represents the number of calendar days counted from the moment the plaintiff
decides to file the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both the days when actions take place
and the waiting periods between. The average duration of different stages of dispute resolution is
recorded: the completion of service of process (time to file and serve the case), the issuance of
judgment (time for the trial and obtaining the judgment) and the moment of payment (time for
enforcement of the judgment).”
Doing Business Project
(2012)
Recovery rate "The recovery rate measures the outcome of insolvency proceedings involving domestic entities. This
measure is recorded as cents on the dollar recouped by creditors through reorganization, liquidation
or debt enforcement (foreclosure) proceedings. The calculation takes into account the outcome:
whether the business emerges from the proceedings as a going concern or the assets are sold
piecemeal. Then the costs of the proceedings are deducted (1 cent for each percentage point of the
value of the debtor’s estate). Finally, the value lost as a result of the time the money remains tied up
in insolvency proceedings is taken into account, including the loss of value due to depreciation. The
recovery rate is the present value of the remaining proceeds.” (Doing Business’ methodology).
Doing Business Project
(2012)
Registering a
property
Number of days required to register a property. We apply the logarithmic transformation. According
to the Doing Business’ methodology, this variable “captures the median duration (in calendar days)
that property lawyers, notaries or registry officials indicate is necessary to complete a procedure. It
is assumed that the minimum time required for each procedure is one day. Although procedures may
take place simultaneously, they cannot start on the same day. It is assumed that the buyer does not
waste time and commits to completing each remaining procedure without delay. If a procedure can
be accelerated for an additional cost, the fastest legal procedure available and used by the majority
of property owners is chosen. If procedures can be undertaken simultaneously, it is assumed that they
are .”
Doing Business Project
(2012)
Starting a business Number of days required to register a firm. We apply the logarithmic transformation. According to the
Doing Business’ methodology, this variable “captures the median duration (in calendar days) that
incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary in practice to complete a procedure with minimum
follow-up with government agencies and no extra payments. It is assumed that the minimum time
required for each procedure is one day. Although procedures may take place simultaneously, they
cannot start on the same day (that is, simultaneous procedures start on consecutive days). A
procedure is considered completed once the company has received the final document, such as the
company registration certificate or tax number. If a procedure can be accelerated for an additional
cost, the fastest procedure is chosen if that option is more beneficial to the economy’s ranking. ”
Doing Business Project
(2012)
Definitions and Data Sources
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Variable Description Source
Court system is
fair, impartial and
uncorrupted
Firms’ assessment of whether courts are fair, impartial and uncorrupted. It ranges from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
Enterprise Surveys
(Standardized Dataset
2006-2013) (World Bank,
2013)
Availability of
information on
law and
regulations
In general, information on the laws and regulations affecting my firm is easy to obtain: (1) fully agree,
(2) agree in most cases, (3) tend to agree, (4) tend to disagree, (5) disagree in most cases, (6) fully
disagree. The indicator is rescaled so that higher scores imply better legal and regulatory outcomes for
the respondents.
WBES (Kaufmann and
Stone, 2003)
Interpretation of
law and
regulations are
consistent
In general, interpretation of regulations affecting my firm is consistent and predictable: (1) fully agree,
(2) agree in most cases, (3) tend to agree, (4) tend to disagree, (5) disagree in most cases, (6) fully
disagree. The indicator is rescaled so that higher scores imply better legal and regulatory outcomes for
the respondents.
WBES (Kaufmann and
Stone, 2003)
Quality and
efficiency of
courts
Overall quality and efficiency of the judiciary/courts:(1) very good, (2) good, (3) slightly good, (4)
slightly bad, (5) bad, (6) very bad. The indicator is rescaled so that higher scores imply better legal
outcomes for the respondents.
WBES (Kaufmann and
Stone, 2003)
Courts are fair and
impartial
In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s courts to be fair and impartial: (1)
always, (2) usually, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom, (6) never. The indicator is rescaled so
that higher scores imply better legal outcomes for the respondents.
WBES (Kaufmann and
Stone, 2003)
Courts are honest In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s courts to be honest and uncorrupted: (1)
always, (2) usually, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom, (6) never. The indicator is rescaled so
that higher scores imply better legal outcomes for the respondents.
WBES (Kaufmann and
Stone, 2003)
Courts
enforceability
In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s courts to enforce decisions: (1) always,
(2) usually, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom, (6) never. The indicator is rescaled so that
higher scores imply better legal outcomes for the respondents.
WBES (Kaufmann and
Stone, 2003)
Confidence in
judicial system
and security
It is constructed as the average of the following variables: confidence in the police force, confidence
in the judicial system, have you had money property stolen from you or another household member?,
and have you been assaulted or mugged? It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values implying greater
confidence. Year 2010.
Worldwide Governance
Indicators Data Sources:
Gallup World Poll
(Dimension of Rule of
Law)
Enforcement of
Gov. regulations
Government regulations are effectively enforced. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values implying
better outcomes. World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index 2012-2013.
World Justice Project
(Botero and Ponce, 2010)
No improper
influence in
applying Gov.
regulations
Government regulations are applied and enforced without improper influence. It ranges from 0 to 1,
with higher values implying better outcomes. World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index 2012-2013.
World Justice Project
(Botero and Ponce, 2010)
No improper Gov.
influence on civil
justice
Civil justice is free of improper government influence. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values
implying better outcomes. World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index 2012-2013.
World Justice Project
(Botero and Ponce, 2010)
No unreasonable
delays
Civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delays. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values implying
better outcomes. World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index 2012-2013.
World Justice Project
(Botero and Ponce, 2010)
Enforcement of
civil justice
Civil justice is effectively enforced. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values implying better
outcomes. World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index 2012-2013.
World Justice Project
(Botero and Ponce, 2010)
Alternative dispute
resolution
mechanisms
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible, impartial, and effective. It ranges from 0 to
1, with higher values implying better outcomes. World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index 2012-2013.
World Justice Project
(Botero and Ponce, 2010)
Main Independent Variables and Controls
Legal origin Legal origin variable: English Common Law, French Commercial Code and Socialist/Communist
Laws. We complement this variable for three countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam) with
information from La Porta et al. (2008).
La Porta et al. (1999),
from Teorell et al. (2011)
Colonizing
country
French, British, Spanish and ‘Others’ former colonies. In the event that a particular colony was
colonized by several colonial powers, the last one that occupied the territory is considered, provided
that the domain lasts for a period of no less than 10 years. The US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and Hong Kong are considered former colonies.
Teorell and Hadenius
(2005), from Teorell et al.
(2011)
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Variable Description Source
Population density Logarithm of population density in 1500 (total population divided by total arable land). AJR (2002)
Settler mortality Logarithm of potential European settler mortality rate, measured in terms of deaths per annum per
1,000.
AJR (2001)
Years since
independence
2000 minus year of independence. Olsson (2009)
Religion Protestants, Catholics, Muslims and others as a percentage of population in 1980. La Porta et al. (1999),
from Teorell et al. (2011)
High indigenous
mortality
Dummy variable indicating whether the country belongs to the New World (North America, the
Caribbean and Latin America) or Oceania, which were the territories where the contact with European
colonizers caused a more dramatic decline in native population due to vulnerability to European
diseases.
Own elaboration according
to Easterly and Levine
(2012)’s methodology
Ethnic
fractionalization
Probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country do not belong to the same
ethnolinguistic group.
Alesina et al. (2003), from
Teorell et al. (2011)
Gap betweem first
sighted and
colonized
Number of years between when a territory was first sighted by Western Europeans and when it was
first colonized by a European power.
Woodberry (2004, 2012)
Land suitability
for cultivation
Measure of land suitability for agriculture. It is calculated as the amount of land suitable for
cultivation over total land area.
Global Land Use Database
(SAGE) (Ramankutty et
al . 2002)
Landlockedness Dummy variable taking a value of one for countries with no direct access to the sea. Own elaboration using
ArcGIS
Distance from the
coast
Distance in hundreds of kilometers from the centroid of the country to the nearest coast. Own elaboration using
ArcGIS
Ln GDP pc 1970 Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series). Year 1970. Heston, Summers, and
Aten (2009)
Continental
dummies
Continental dummies for Africa, America and Asia. Own elaboration
Robustness Checks
Customary courts Ratio of colonially recognized customary court cases over the total number of court cases in 1955,
with the latter comprising both customary court cases heard by native chiefs and magistrate court
cases handled by British officials.
Lange (2004, 2009)
Early European
settlement
European population share in 1900. AJR (2001)
European
population share
in 1960
European population share in 1960. Atlas Narodov Mira
(1964)
Africans per
European
administrator
Number of Africans per European administrator. Richens (2009)
Precolonial
centralization
A country’s percentage of population that belonged to centralized ethnic groups, as in Gennaioli and
Rainer (2007).
Gennaioli and Rainer
(2007), Atlas Narodov
Mira and Ethnographic
Atlas of Murdock (1967)
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Antigua and Barbuda South Africa Implantation by France Spanish Law legacy Others
Australia Sri Lanka Algeria Argentina Angola
Bangladesh St. Kitts and Nevis Benin Bolivia Brazil
Belize St. Lucia Burkina Faso Chile Burundi
Botswana St. Vincent and the Gr. Cambodia Colombia Cape Verde
Canada Sudan Cameroon Costa Rica Congo, Dem. Rep.
Dominica Swaziland Central African Rep. Dominican Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep.
Gambia, The Tanzania Chad Ecuador Eritrea
Ghana Trinidad and Tobago Comoros Equatorial Guinea Guinea-Bissau
Grenada Uganda Congo, Rep. Guatemala Indonesia
Guyana United Arab Emirates Côte d'Ivoire Honduras Iraq
Hong Kong United States Gabon Mexico Jordan
India Zambia Guinea Nicaragua Kuwait
Jamaica Zimbabwe Haiti Panama Mozambique
Kenya Lao PDR Peru Oman
Lesotho Lebanon Paraguay Philippines
Malawi Madagascar El Salvador Rwanda
Malaysia Mali Uruguay Suriname
Namibia Mauritania Venezuela, RB Yemen, Rep.
New Zealand Morocco
Nigeria Niger
Pakistan Senegal
Papua New Guinea Syrian Arab Rep.
Sierra Leone Togo
Singapore Tunisia
Vietnam
British Common Law French Civil law
List of Former Colonies
Table A2
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Dependent variable Creditorrights
Investor
protection
Information
sharing
Contract
enforcement
Recovery
rate
Starting a
business
Registering
a property
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
- Common law (Ref. group)
- Civil law groups:
-4.370** -2.515** -0.824+ 0.142 -34.981** 0.832** 0.864*
(0.35) (0.43) (0.42) (0.12) (4.51) (0.26) (0.35)
-3.779** -1.582** 2.944** 0.171 -12.061* 0.754** 0.071
(0.43) (0.40) (0.40) (0.11) (5.33) (0.19) (0.20)
-4.051** -1.458** 0.117 0.265+ -28.960** 1.387** 0.450
(0.37) (0.46) (0.59) (0.15) (4.91) (0.29) (0.28)
-0.438** -0.341* -0.632** 0.176** -7.411** 0.224* 0.314**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.05) (2.02) (0.10) (0.09)
- Civil law groups × Pop. dens.:
-0.112 0.209 0.075 -0.064 9.552** -0.254 -0.202
(0.25) (0.23) (0.29) (0.07) (2.62) (0.16) (0.19)
0.191 -0.277 -0.225 0.015 0.199 0.088 -0.082
(0.29) (0.20) (0.21) (0.06) (3.95) (0.11) (0.09)
-0.269* -0.056 -0.200 -0.051 1.132 -0.384** 0.065
(0.11) (0.17) (0.22) (0.07) (1.26) (010) (0.13)
7.343** 5.886** 1.934** 6.326** 38.137** 3.246** 3.754**
(0.29) (0.28) (0.32) (0.08) (3.60) (0.15) (0.15)
R 2 0.72 0.37 0.50 0.23 0.43 0.36 0.23
Number of observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Differences in predicted values when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
Imp. by France - Common law -3.6* -1.2* 0.8 -0.4* 4.1 -0.3 -0.3
Spanish law leg.- Common law -2.3* -1.4* 3.9* -0.2 5.5 0.4 -0.8*
Others - Common law -3.7* -0.8 1.1 -0.3 -9.3 0.0 -0.1
- Common law × Pop. dens.
• Implantation by France × Pop.
dens.
• Spanish law legacy × Pop.
dens.
• Others × Pop. dens.
Constant
Note. This table presents results from estimating equation (1) for the seven dependent variables. The description of variables is
provided in Table A1. The sample contains non-European countries colonized by Western powers (Table A2). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. In the bottom part of the table we show the differences in predicted values between the common law and
each civil law category when pre-colonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3). For the sake of simplicity, the statistical
significance of the differences in predicted values is assessed only at the 5% level.
+ Statistically significant at the 10% level.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
Table 1
Main Regressions
Creditor and investor rigths and
disclosure Legal system efficiency Regulations
• Implantation by France
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Years since
independence
Religion (p-
value)
High
indigenous
mortality
Ethnic
fractiona-
lization
Economic
potential (p-
value)
Ln GDP pc
1970
Continental
dummies (p-
value)
Leverage Standard.Residuals Cook’s D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
- Common law (Ref. group)
- Civil law:
-4.379** -4.270** -4.325** -4.209** -4.129** -4.144** -4.279** -7.297** -4.484** -4.640** -4.826**
(0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.45) (0.48) (0.36) (0.38) (1.75) (0.35) (0.31) (0.30)
-3.921** -3.654** -3.861** -3.761** -3.947** -3.867** -3.861** -6.954 -4.150** -3.992** -4.204**
(0.56) (0.60) (0.48) (0.43) (0.51) (0.44) (0.50) (4.30) (0.46) (0.40) (0.49)
-4.059** -3.837** -4.026** -3.917** -3.988** -3.984** -4.044** -0.488 -4.018** -4.265** -4.324**
(0.38) (0.46) (0.39) (0.40) (0.48) (0.36) (0.38) (1.81) (0.37) (0.34) (0.35)
-0.430** -0.366* -0.426** -0.392* -0.488** -0.354* -0.432** -0.525* -0.438** -0.450** -0.517**
(0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.25) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12)
- Civil law × endowments:
-0.106 -0.054 -0.104 -0.183 -0.199 -0.188 -0.133 0.130 0.051 -0.080 0.113
(0.25) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.32) (0.26) (0.24) (0.22) (0.31) (0.18) (0.08)
0.198 0.192 0.196 0.221 0.183 0.271 0.197 0.226 1.363* 0.191 0.863
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.92) (0.58) (0.29) (0.67)
-0.265* -0.254* -0.253* -0.282* -0.206 -0.206+ -0.254* -1.199** -0.373** -0.269* -0.269*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.27) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
0.001 [0.953] 0.150 -0.396 [0.300] 0.264 [0.879]
(0.00) (0.45) (0.64) (0.18)
7.291** 7.653** 7.284** 7.492** 7.073** 5.223** 7.388** 9.543** 7.343** 7.556** 7.616**
(0.33) (0.99) (0.36) (0.37) (0.70) (1.41) (0.47) (1.12) (0.29) (0.25) (0.27)
R 2 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.80 0.80
Number of observations 100 98 100 98 98 98 100 75 92 94 91
Differences in predicted values when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
Imp. by France - Common law -3.6* -3.6* -3.6* -3.7* -3.5* -3.8* -3.6* -3.2* -3.4* -3.8* -3.4*
Spanish law leg.- Common law -2.5* -2.4* -2.4* -2.4* -2.4* -2.4* -2.4* -2.3 0.0 -2.5* -1.0
Others - Common law -3.7* -3.6* -3.6* -3.7* -3.3* -3.6* -3.6* -4.7* -3.9* -3.8* -3.8*
Table 2
Robustness Checks: Creditor Rights
Control variables Settler
mortality as
endowments
indicator
Outliers
• Implantation by France
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
- Common law × endowments
• Implantation by France ×
endowments
• Spanish law legacy ×
endowments
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
• Others × endowments
Control variables
Constant
Note. The dependent variable is creditor rights. The endowments indicator is population density in 1500, except in column 8. Variable descriptions are provided in
Table A1. The sample contains non-European countries colonized by Western powers (Table A2). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Figures in square
brackets represent p-values of joint significance. In the bottom part of the table we show the differences in predicted values between the common law and each
civil law category when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3) (in column 8, we take a value for settler mortality of 500 (log=6.2)). For the sake of
simplicity, the statistical significance of the differences in predicted values is assessed only at the 5% level.
+ Statistically significant at the 10% level.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Years since
independence
Religion (p-
value)
High
indigenous
mortality
Ethnic
fractiona-
lization
Economic
potential (p-
value)
Ln GDP pc
1970
Continental
dummies (p-
value)
Leverage Standard.Residuals Cook’s D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
- Common law (Ref. group)
- Civil law:
-2.578** -2.458** -2.379** -2.485** -2.223** -2.060** -1.968** -7.534** -2.394** -2.524** -2.700**
(0.45) (0.48) (0.49) (0.44) (0.46) (0.44) (0.55) (1.51) (0.44) (0.41) (0.37)
-2.525** -1.355* -1.834** -1.511** -1.763** -1.759** -1.678** -7.133* -1.553** -1.590** -1.501**
(0.53) (0.54) (0.39) (0.42) (0.46) (0.40) (0.37) (3.18) (0.52) (0.38) (0.41)
-1.508** -1.405* -1.380** -1.391** -1.765** -1.576** -1.480** -2.535 -0.988* -1.139** -1.050**
(0.44) (0.57) (0.52) (0.47) (0.54) (0.47) (0.46) (4.61) (0.46) (0.35) (0.38)
-0.287+ -0.317+ -0.305+ -0.297+ -0.368* -0.172 -0.331* -0.808** -0.341* -0.309* -0.281+
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.21) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
- Civil law × endowments:
0.247 0.153 0.231 0.229 -0.009 0.055 -0.013 0.230 0.036 0.209 0.346+
(0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.23) (0.26) (0.20) (0.29) (0.23) (0.19)
-0.234 -0.266 -0.262 -0.285 -0.332 -0.116 -0.255 0.416 -0.367 -0.277 -0.277
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) (0.65) (0.85) (0.20) (0.20)
-0.033 -0.087 -0.008 -0.048 0.056 0.076 -0.029 -0.551 -0.442* -0.201 -0.201
(0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.87) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13)
0.008* [0.892] 0.460 0.111 [0.014] 0.531** [0.013]
(0.00) (0.45) (0.63) (0.16)
5.540** 5.817** 5.704** 5.769** 6.252** 1.619 6.535** 9.649** 5.886** 5.894** 5.806**
(0.33) (0.95) (0.39) (0.46) (0.66) (1.25) (0.44) (0.96) (0.28) (0.24) (0.28)
R 2 0.39 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.56 0.39 0.44 0.38
Number of observations 100 98 100 98 98 98 100 75 92 95 97
Differences in predicted values when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
Imp. by France - Common law -1.3* -1.4* -1.1* -1.3* -1.4* -1.5* -1.2* -1.1* -1.5* -1.3* -1.3*
Spanish law leg.- Common law -2.4* -1.2 -1.7* -1.5* -1.7* -1.6* -1.5* 0.5 -1.6 -1.5* -1.5*
Others - Common law -0.9* -0.9 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -1.0* -0.8 -0.9 -1.2* -0.9* -0.9
Note. The dependent variable is investor protection. See notes to Table 2 for the rest.
Control variables
Constant
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
- Common law × endowments
• Implantation by France ×
endowments
• Spanish law legacy ×
endowments
• Others × endowments
• Implantation by France
Table 3
Robustness Checks: Investor Protection
Control variables Settler
mortality as
endowments
indicator
Outliers
52
Years since
independence
Religion (p-
value)
High
indigenous
mortality
Ethnic
fractiona-
lization
Economic
potential (p-
value)
Ln GDP pc
1970
Continental
dummies (p-
value)
Leverage Standard.Residuals Cook’s D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
- Common law (Ref. group)
- Civil law:
-0.992* -0.852+ -0.951* -0.640 -1.046* -0.326 -0.480 -5.364** -0.707+ -0.513 -0.452
(0.44) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45) (0.37) (0.49) (1.06) (0.39) (0.39) (0.37)
0.418 2.698** 3.177** 2.953** 2.184** 2.750** 3.377** -1.382 2.891** 3.255** 3.132**
(0.54) (0.73) (0.55) (0.42) (0.50) (0.38) (0.56) (3.52) (0.41) (0.37) (0.39)
-0.016 0.173 0.044 0.301 -0.562 0.219 0.022 -7.675** 0.164 0.427 0.216
(0.45) (0.63) (0.62) (0.59) (0.62) (0.62) (0.60) (2.74) (0.52) (0.57) (0.52)
-0.489** -0.652** -0.666** -0.586** -0.618** -0.448* -0.657** -1.184** -0.632** -0.837** -0.828**
(0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
- Civil law × endowments:
0.178 -0.003 0.054 -0.013 0.533 -0.094 -0.177 -0.139 -0.091 0.075 -0.187
(0.30) (0.33) (0.30) (0.29) (0.39) (0.22) (0.31) (0.11) (0.21) (0.29) (0.20)
-0.111 -0.202 -0.239 -0.189 -0.366+ -0.049 -0.231 -0.206 -0.057 -0.225 -0.225
(0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (0.78) (0.54) (0.21) (0.21)
-0.139 -0.231 -0.245 -0.210 0.039 -0.059 -0.262 0.421 -0.361 -0.200 -0.146
(0.13) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.49) (0.25) (0.22) (0.15)
0.020** [0.663] -0.426 -0.485 [0.008] 0.581** [ 0.030]
(0.00) (0.57) (0.67) (0.18)
1.008** 0.525 2.103** 2.129** 3.389** -2.736+ 2.814** 7.352** 1.934** 1.624** 1.746**
(0.35) (1.13) (0.40) (0.49) (0.75) (1.43) (0.46) (0.81) (0.32) (0.28) (0.30)
R 2 0.61 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.74 0.50 0.60 0.60
Number of observations 100 98 100 98 98 98 100 75 92 97 95
Differences in predicted values when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
Imp. by France - Common law 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.6* 0.5 0.6 1.1* 0.5 1.6* 1.0
Spanish law leg.- Common law 1.3 3.7* 4.2* 3.9* 2.8* 3.7* 4.4* 4.7* 4.2* 4.7* 4.5*
Others - Common law 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9 2.3* 0.8 1.9* 1.8*
Table 4
Robustness Checks: Information Sharing
Note. The dependent variable is information sharing. See notes to Table 2 for the rest.
• Spanish law legacy ×
endowments
• Others × endowments
Constant
Control variables
• Implantation by France
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
- Common law × endowments
• Implantation by France ×
endowments
Control variables OutliersSettler
mortality as
endowments
indicator
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Years since
independence
Religion (p-
value)
High
indigenous
mortality
Ethnic
fractiona-
lization
Economic
potential (p-
value)
Ln GDP pc
1970
Continental
dummies (p-
value)
Leverage Standard.Residuals Cook’s D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
- Common law (Ref. group)
- Civil law:
0.136 0.109 0.183 0.106 0.164 0.106 0.135 0.875 0.206+ 0.156 0.196+
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.59) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
0.081 0.034 0.095 0.159 0.078 0.184 0.045 1.543+ 0.164 0.185+ 0.193+
(0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.92) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
0.260+ 0.242 0.288+ 0.254+ 0.305+ 0.326* 0.286+ 2.282** 0.203 0.123 0.151
(0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.84) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12)
0.181** 0.165** 0.187** 0.162** 0.172** 0.163** 0.184** 0.155** 0.176** 0.167** 0.198**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
- Civil law × endowments:
-0.060 -0.051 -0.057 -0.052 -0.025 -0.052 -0.032 -0.027 -0.156* -0.064 -0.110+
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
0.019 0.006 0.020 0.010 -0.005 0.003 0.020 -0.163 0.038 0.015 0.015
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.18) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06)
-0.049 -0.044 -0.036 -0.045 -0.048 -0.062 -0.031 -0.271 -0.085 -0.010 -0.024
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.17) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03)
0.001 [0.827] 0.139 0.066 [0.358] -0.041 [0.236]
(0.00) (0.14) (0.17) (0.06)
6.293** 6.277** 6.271** 6.310** 6.431** 6.655** 6.197** 5.695** 6.326** 6.311** 6.304**
(0.10) (0.30) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.49) (0.12) (0.30) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
R 2 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.29
Number of observations 100 98 100 98 98 98 100 75 92 95 92
Differences in predicted values when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
Imp. by France - Common law -0.4* -0.4* -0.4* -0.4* -0.3 -0.4* -0.4* -0.3 -0.6* -0.4* -0.5*
Spanish law leg.- Common law -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Others - Common law -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4* -0.3 -0.4*
Table 5
Robustness Checks: Contract Enforcement
Note. The dependent variable is contract enforcement. See notes to Table 2 for the rest.
• Others × endowments
Control variables
Constant
• Implantation by France
• Spanish law legacy
• Spanish law legacy ×
endowments
- Common law × endowments
• Implantation by France ×
endowments
Control variables Settler
mortality as
endowments
indicator
Outliers
• Others
54
Years since
independence
Religion (p-
value)
High
indigenous
mortality
Ethnic
fractiona-
lization
Economic
potential (p-
value)
Ln GDP pc
1970
Continental
dummies (p-
value)
Leverage Standard.Residuals Cook’s D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
- Common law (Ref. group)
- Civil law:
-35.948** -35.949** -34.811** -36.092** -35.154** -27.935** -30.074** -40.764+ -35.923** -37.131** -31.073**
(4.79) (5.07) (4.50) (4.55) (4.22) (4.43) (5.01) (22.28) (4.76) (4.19) (4.40)
-26.615** -11.906 -12.376+ -10.752+ -16.104** -14.804** -9.644 -13.73 -15.570** -16.808** -12.408*
(6.98) (8.08) (7.23) (5.45) (6.01) (5.09) (7.68) (51.98) (5.19) (4.55) (4.98)
-29.725** -30.501** -28.862** -29.740** -35.173** -30.945** -29.689** -42.921+ -25.910** -31.110** -26.229**
(5.37) (5.05) (4.76) (5.02) (4.84) (4.19) (3.91) (25.12) (6.39) (4.62) (4.96)
-6.585** -8.218** -7.366** -6.981** -7.074** -4.798* -7.527** -9.934** -7.411** -6.984** -6.241**
(1.93) (2.44) (2.15) (2.19) (1.87) (1.95) (1.75) (2.32) (2.03) (1.82) (2.26)
- Civil law × endowments:
10.142** 7.061* 9.580** 10.766** 10.631** 7.166* 6.817+ -5.730+ 10.888** 9.552** 7.614**
(2.88) (2.74) (2.67) (2.63) (3.08) (3.09) (3.83) (3.13) (3.48) (2.63) (2.12)
0.859 0.206 0.217 -0.304 -1.093 2.688 0.266 -10.272 11.273 -2.956 -1.106
(3.91) (4.09) (3.96) (3.99) (4.10) (3.72) (3.97) (11.30) (8.35) (2.25) (3.11)
1.486 -0.088 1.192 1.326 2.430 2.895** 0.854 -7.418+ -2.364 1.132 1.132
(1.70) (1.16) (1.51) (1.30) (1.49) (0.99) (1.28) (4.16) (2.40) (1.27) (1.26)
0.116* [0.112] 0.575 6.700 [0.003] 8.220** [0.010]
(0.05) (6.78) (6.62) (1.97)
32.801** 27.182+ 37.909** 34.013** 52.885** -27.923+ 47.092** 86.741** 38.137** 40.287** 35.407**
(4.52) (16.31) (3.83) (5.24) (6.46) (15.41) (4.28) (11.98) (3.61) (3.18) (3.66)
R 2 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.56 0.44 0.54 0.39
Number of observations 100 98 100 98 98 98 100 75 92 93 94
Differences in predicted values when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
Imp. by France - Common law 2.6 -0.8 4.2 4.8 5.6 -0.4 3.0 -14.6* 6.2 0.9 0.8
Spanish law leg.- Common law -9.5 7.5 5.1 4.6 -2.3 2.4 8.3 -15.8 27.5 -7.5 -0.6
Others - Common law -11.1 -11.8* -9.2 -10.6 -13.3* -13.2* -10.4 -27.3* -14.3* -12.4* -9.3
Control variables
Constant
Note. The dependent variable is recovery rate. See notes to Table 2 for the rest.
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
- Common law × endowments
• Implantation by France ×
endowments
• Spanish law legacy ×
endowments
• Others × endowments
• Implantation by France
Table 6
Robustness Checks: Recovery Rate
Control variables Settler
mortality as
endowments
indicator
Outliers
55
Years since
independence
Religion (p-
value)
High
indigenous
mortality
Ethnic
fractiona-
lization
Economic
potential (p-
value)
Ln GDP pc
1970
Continental
dummies (p-
value)
Leverage Standard.Residuals Cook’s D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
- Common law (Ref. group)
- Civil law:
0.864** 0.955** 0.707* 0.741* 0.851** 0.556+ 0.686+ 1.005 0.901** 0.854** 0.775**
(0.29) (0.27) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.28) (0.35) (1.04) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26)
1.230** 1.221** 0.985** 0.767** 0.868** 0.861** 0.920** 4.100+ 0.841** 0.776** 0.747**
(0.37) (0.33) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.24) (2.11) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19)
1.412** 1.692** 1.315** 1.342** 1.651** 1.453** 1.370** 4.542+ 1.204** 1.333** 1.209**
(0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (2.57) (0.31) (0.27) (0.24)
0.197* 0.256* 0.191+ 0.210+ 0.233** 0.122 0.213* 0.253* 0.224* 0.259** 0.174*
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
- Civil law × endowments:
-0.273 -0.224 -0.275 -0.202 -0.257 -0.161 -0.227 0.128 -0.352+ -0.254 -0.172
(0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) (0.14)
0.067 0.144 0.075 0.067 0.091 -0.009 0.077 -0.501 -0.185 0.088 0.088
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.46) (0.27) (0.11) (0.11)
-0.396** -0.384** -0.428** -0.370** -0.475** -0.463** -0.414** -0.455 -0.258 -0.394** -0.308**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.50) (0.19) (0.10) (0.08)
-0.004 [0.004] -0.422 0.288 [0.092] -0.322** [0.406]
(0.00) (0.28) (0.36) (0.09)
3.421** 3.432** 3.413** 3.112** 3.128** 5.835** 3.207** 2.058** 3.246** 3.224** 3.253**
(0.20) (0.79) (0.18) (0.26) (0.31) (0.74) (0.21) (0.59) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
R 2 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.32
Number of observations 100 98 100 98 98 98 100 75 92 95 94
Differences in predicted values when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
Imp. by France - Common law -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.0
Spanish law leg.- Common law 0.9* 1.0* 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.5
Others - Common law 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1
Table 7
Robustness Checks: Starting a Business
• Others × endowments
Control variables
Constant
Note. The dependent variable is starting a business. See notes to Table 2 for the rest.
• Implantation by France
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
- Common law × endowments
• Implantation by France ×
endowments
Control variables Settler
mortality as
endowments
indicator
Outliers
• Spanish law legacy ×
endowments
56
Years since
independence
Religion (p-
value)
High
indigenous
mortality
Ethnic
fractiona-
lization
Economic
potential (p-
value)
Ln GDP pc
1970
Continental
dummies (p-
value)
Leverage Standard.Residuals Cook’s D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
- Common law (Ref. group)
- Civil law:
0.868* 0.945** 0.875* 0.778+ 1.114** 0.605+ 0.666+ 2.113+ 0.726* 0.516* 0.516*
(0.34) (0.30) (0.38) (0.43) (0.27) (0.34) (0.38) (1.19) (0.35) (0.25) (0.25)
0.124 -0.142 0.052 0.119 -0.011 0.172 -0.182 -1.693 0.048 -0.065 -0.065
(0.47) (0.37) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (2.15) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18)
0.453 0.546+ 0.456 0.497+ 0.753* 0.580+ 0.505+ 3.099* 0.239 0.314 0.168
(0.28) (0.33) (0.28) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.25) (1.30) (0.34) (0.26) (0.25)
0.311** 0.400** 0.317** 0.320** 0.270** 0.218* 0.329** 0.445** 0.314** 0.341** 0.341**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
- Civil law × endowments:
-0.205 -0.053 -0.201 -0.135 -0.207 -0.114 -0.056 0.077 -0.006 -0.096 -0.096
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.16) (0.16)
-0.085 -0.089 -0.081 -0.110 -0.089 -0.174 -0.079 0.810+ -0.009 -0.082 -0.082
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.46) (0.23) (0.09) (0.09)
0.064 0.148 0.069 0.096 0.079 0.004 0.101 -0.036 0.243 0.065 0.067
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.25) (0.19) (0.13) (0.10)
0.000 [0.020] 0.036 0.373 [0.002] -0.303** [0.022]
(0.00) (0.29) (0.46) (0.11)
3.773** 3.839** 3.740** 3.549** 3.240** 6.190** 3.243** 1.981** 3.754** 3.890** 3.890**
(0.18) (0.50) (0.18) (0.28) (0.36) (0.87) (0.27) (0.67) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11)
R 2 0.23 0.31 0.23 0.25 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.28
Number of observations 100 98 100 98 98 98 100 75 92 97 93
Differences in predicted values when precolonial population density is equal to 10 (log=2.3)
Imp. by France - Common law -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.5
Spanish law leg.- Common law -0.8 -1.3* -0.9 -0.9* -0.8* -0.7 -1.1* 0.6 -0.7 -1.0* -1.0*
Others - Common law -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.5
Control variables
Constant
Note. The dependent variable is registering a property. See notes to Table 2 for the rest.
• Spanish law legacy
• Others
- Common law × endowments
• Implantation by France ×
endowments
• Spanish law legacy ×
endowments
• Others × endowments
• Implantation by France
Table 8
Robustness Checks: Registering a Property
Control variables Settler
mortality as
endowments
indicator
Outliers
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Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel A: Two-stage Least Squares Results
-0.053* -0.051* -0.046** -0.047** -0.050* -0.054** 0.019** 0.017** -0.700** -0.717** 0.031** 0.033** 0.032** 0.034**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1.926 2.066 -9.119 -8.710 -52.984** -51.379** 2.248 2.766 -484.526** -484.217** 2.770 1.953 12.748 13.891+
(12.94) (12.96) (11.90) (12.02) (11.88) (12.45) (4.39) (4.36) (154.89) (163.23) (6.27) (6.41) (7.76) (7.92)
0.556 0.519 -1.081 -1.064 0.512 0.562 -0.346 -0.316 4.012 4.344 0.484 0.459 -0.263 -0.324
(0.94) (0.95) (0.80) (0.81) (0.99) (1.00) (0.27) (0.26) (10.57) (10.68) (0.47) (0.49) (0.42) (0.46)
0.246+ 0.240+ 0.133 0.138 0.068 0.084 -0.067+ -0.059+ 2.015+ 2.080+ -0.152* -0.160* -0.176* -0.183*
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) (1.10) (1.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002* -0.002* -0.012 -0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B: First Stage Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14
9.948** 7.630**
(1.73) (2.11)
-0.223+
(0.13)
-269.689+ -273.277+
(145.76) (150.33)
29.632** 22.529+
(9.77) (11.35)
2.817* 3.317*
(1.27) (1.31)
0.037 0.031
(0.04) (0.04)
Partial R 2 0.42 0.45
F- statistic 33.13 19.26
R 2 0.63 0.64
Observations 37 36
Panel C: Test of Overidentification (2) (4) (6) (8) (10) (12) (14)
P-value 0.764 0.804 0.525 0.295 0.807 0.406 0.498
Panel D: Second Stage with Modern-day European Descendants as Exogenous Variable
-0.080* -0.083** -0.066** -0.069** -0.083* -0.088** 0.028* 0.028* -1.108** -1.177** 0.035** 0.036** 0.021+ 0.022*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.37) (0.36) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-2.090+ -2.252+ -1.518 -1.663 -2.548 -2.724+ 0.688 0.774 -31.171 -34.911+ 0.285 0.265 -0.838 -0.733
(1.22) (1.20) (1.07) (1.06) (1.55) (1.52) (0.55) (0.56) (20.04) (20.25) (0.54) (0.55) (0.66) (0.65)
P-value (overid-test) 0.700 0.347 0.072 0.775 0.241 0.272 0.644
Observations 37 36 37 36 37 36 37 36 37 36 37 36 37 36
Distance to the coast
Note. Panel A presents the two-stage least-squares estimates with Doing Business indicators employed as the dependent variable. Panel B reports the corresponding first stage for the case in
which precolonial population density is the only instrument for the extent of indirect rule and the case in which the instruments are precolonial population density and the European population
share in 1900. Panel C reports the p-value associated with the overidentification test, and Panel D presents the results from the two-stage least-squares regression into which the modern-day
European population share is incorporated as an exogenous variable. Regressions include a constant term which is omitted to save space. Regressions in panel D also include the following
controls: land suitability, landlockedness, distance to the coast and gap between first sighted and colonized. The description of variables is provided in Table A1. The sample contains non-
European countries colonized by Western powers (Table A2). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Small-sample correction for standard errors is applied.
Creditor rights Investor protection Information sharing Contractenforcement
Modern-day European
descendants (%)
Customary court cases (%
of total)
Gap between first sighted
and colonized
+ Statistically significant at the 10% level.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Recovery rate Starting a business
Landlockedness
Landlockedness
Distance to the coast
Gap between first sighted
and colonized
Population density in 1500
Table 10
Exploring the Mechanisms
Land suitability for
cultivation
Customary court cases (%
of total)
Land suitability for
cultivation
Euro share in 1900
Registering a
property
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Figure 1. The Distribution of the British common law and the French civil law:
Investor protection
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Figure 2. The Distribution of the British common law and the French civil law:
Contract enforcement
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